# THE REVIEW

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## Contents

Brief Comment 243

*Editorial Articles:*

Bring It to a Head! 245
The Seamen's Strike 246
The Austrian Terms 247
Housing and Prices 247
Disorganizing the Army 248
A Great Physician 249

Sticking Labels on Frenchmen. By Stoddard Dewey 250
China's Reaction to the Shantung Settlement. By Kuang-Ti May 251
The American Commission in Syria. By Ameen Rihani 252
Correspondence 253
Book Reviews:
Economics and British Common Sense 256
National Readjustments 257
A Novelists' Novelist and His Clients 258
Three Books About Poetry 259
The Run of the Shelves 260
It All Depends. By Gustavus Myers 261

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IT would be folly to deny the gravity of the race rioting at Chicago. Such a clash between whites and blacks in the second city of the country would be matter for sober thought at any time, and gives occasion for peculiar anxiety now, when the minds of men are unsettled and multitudes are infected with the virus of revolutionism. But we see no reason whatever for regarding the disorders at Washington and Chicago—even if they should be followed by similar outbreaks elsewhere—as the beginning of a "race war," or even the signal for an entirely new régime in the relations between whites and blacks in this country. The South ought to learn a lesson from them, for it has certainly fallen far short of its duty toward the negroes; and in the North, too, there is plenty to be done in the way of improvement. But we have to recognize to-day, as we have had to recognize these fifty years, that there is no short-cut solution of the race problem. Give the negro a fair chance for education and employment; put an end to the unspeakable atrocity of lynching; let him be sure of impartial justice in the courts. All this can be done, and must be done if we are to have decent relations between the races; the rest must be left to the slow work of time. There have been several previous occasions—East St. Louis and Atlanta need only be mentioned—when race troubles have looked quite as formidable as they do to-day, but proved to be only passing explosions. And although the present outbreaks suggest sinister possibilities on account of the Bolshevik element that enters into them in a greater or less degree, it would be foolish to jump to the conclusion that they will actually take on the dimensions of an extensive race struggle.

"DOG eat dog" is the phrase that comes to mind nowadays in following the various quirks and turns of German revelations. The Erzberger bombshell of last week was one of the most curious of these developments. One felt like applauding a move that seemed to have for its object the fixing of guilt for the prolongation of the war upon German arrogance in the face of conciliatory approaches by the Allies, but while there are a great many things yet to be cleared up, the presumption is overwhelming that no really new knowledge of this kind can be forthcoming. Germany's case is bad enough without any artificial heightening of her guilt. The devil may be as black as he was painted, but it is pretty certain that he is no blacker. Those outside of Germany who remember the events of the time were little stirred by the Erzberger story, which bore internal evidence of being a falsely colored version of the well-known facts connected with the papal intercession of 1917. And now comes M. Ribot, who was French Premier and Foreign Minister at the time, and flatly declares that Erzberger's statement is "a distortion of the truth"—that the proposals for overtures to Germany originated with Pope Benedict and were declined by both France and Great Britain with "the politest acknowledgment to the Pope, but nothing more." That the German military clique *would* have received any overtures in a truculent spirit, if the overtures had been made, is possibly what Erzberger's documentary evidence really shows. But that hardly required proof; and in any case the demonstration of this hypothetical wickedness is too much like the antiquarian's exhibit of Balaam's sword to command any great interest.

APOLOGISTS for the transfer of the German rights in Shantung to Japan have advanced the plea that German influence is still too deeply rooted in that region to be eradicated by so weak a power as China. The case is said to need a strong hand, and to call for a temporary occupation. This contention involves a matter of fact which has not been made clear. If the facts are such, the whole case could be settled by an explicit expression of intention from Japan accompanied by a promise to withdraw when the mission shall have been fulfilled. Short of a Japanese Platt amendment, the situation remains inherently threatening and most prejudicial to the claims of the Covenant. What makes the case worse is the recent brutal repression of the disturbances in Korea. Japan has not shone as a self-appointed mandatory. She does not come with such clean hands that the Senate is bound perfunctorily to accept her apparent spoliation of China. Proper diplomatic assurances from Japan would clear the air and are emphatically in order.

THE British are having trying times, and it is hard for outsiders to understand why they do not settle down to work and enjoy the fruits of victory. But internal troubles, especially the miners' grievances, are causing more anxiety than the terrific German drive of last year in Picardy and Flanders. It was thought that the miners would be satisfied with the seven-hour day and the increased pay allowed them by the Interim Sankey Report, as it was understood that piece rates would be adjusted to the new conditions, so that, although the output would be reduced by about ten per cent., the miners would get for seven hours the wages which they had previously received for eight hours, and two shillings a day besides. But the Coal Controller, it seems, made some mistake in his calculations, and the Yorkshire miners with some from other counties—about 250,000 in all—went on strike until the difficulty should be settled. They feared that they were going to be defrauded of their rightful due; but in general they were in a bad frame of mind—disgusted with the Government and the bureaucracy, suspicious of the mine owners, stubborn in their demand for nationalization, angry about

the increase in the price of coal, the high cost of living, intervention in Russia, and smarting under the lash of public criticism. They must have been in an ugly mood or they would not have deserted the pumps, leaving the mines, their own source of livelihood, in danger of being ruined.

The Government took immediate steps to prevent this disaster by sending bluejackets to man the pumps and soldiers to protect the bluejackets, and then Mr. David Lloyd George, with his mighty men—Hon. Andrew Bonar Law, Sir Eric Geddes and Sir Auckland Geddes—made haste to hold conferences with the leaders of the miners, for already manufacturers were shutting down their plants for lack of coal, exports had ceased and the danger of extensive trouble was imminent. The difficulty was settled in the usual way, by concessions to the miners, and one more crisis in British industry was over. But it is evident that further trouble is brewing, for the miners are determined to force the issue of nationalization, which Parliament does not want, and their leaders, who have urged them on, are unable to keep them in hand. The politicians, too, are beginning to wish that they had been more chary of their promises. Workers in other industries, together with the unemployed, are beginning to see that the miners have gone too far with their policy of rule or ruin, and there is growing indignation against them. The other members of the Triple Alliance—the railway men and the transport workers—suffer when coal is dear and when the miners go on strike, so there is a possibility of their wavering in their loyalty, for the solidarity of labor is by no means complete. Sooner or later it may be necessary for the Government, backed by public opinion, to come to grips with the miners, and when they do there will be a terrible struggle, the outcome of which no man can foresee. Once more the keystone of the British industrial arch seems to be weakening, and there is danger that the whole structure may collapse. It is surely time for our English cousins to pull themselves together, and to say to one another, in the fine words of Shakespeare: "Nought shall make us rue, if England to itself do stand but true."

CLEMENCEAU has received two votes of confidence, with increasing majorities, within a week. It is plain that the snap vote against the Minister of Provisions had no general bearings, and the Tiger's position seems quite safe for the few weeks or months he is going to want it. His vindication, though fully expected, is welcome as showing that despite superficial revolutionary talk, everything is really taking a normal parliamentary course in France. Alarmists who see in Europe nothing but organized revolt would do well to note the collapse of the general political strikes set for England, France, and Italy on the 20th and 21st. These were to be demonstrations that would shake the existing political order. On the day set for the symbolic uprising, there were sporadic strikes, but nothing of consequence. The Social Revolution was indefinitely postponed. All of which goes to prove that labor unions, parliaments, and men generally are more sensible than their constant talk and occasional actions would seem to indicate.

IT is not premature to give to commercial aviation the best consideration the country is capable of. With the air mail-service attaining to the dignity of a strike, it is plain that, in however limited a way, the fields of air are susceptible of still further profitable cultivation. If so, America can scarcely afford to lag behind. It does not do to assume that primacy in what may prove to be an important form of human achievement must inevitably gravitate to us, without effort on our part. Nor will it do to importune the Government to do something about it. The Government might do much more than it is doing if it maintained some of its plants and flying fields, if it made available its store of Curtiss training planes to the many hardy young men who are eager to continue, or to learn, the business of flying. It might do much to bring up a race of flyers useful for the enlargement as well as the preservation of the blessings of peace. But if commercial flying is to amount to anything, it must come as the result of courageous and unwearying private enterprise. Already, we understand, private enterprise in England is prepared to spend $60,000,000 in the development of flying. America starts with a handicap in the matter of motor patents and of plane patents. But the door is not closed to us yet, though that may happen soon. The suggestion of a speaker at a recent meeting of the Aeronautical Society that planes of similar performance to our DeHavilands be employed for trans-oceanic flights in a system of eight-hundred-mile relays, a plane dropping its thousand-pound cargo on a mother ship cruising about a fixed point, then refueling and returning to its base, leaving its cargo to be carried over the next stage by another plane, may not be the ultimate solution. But it is well worth looking into. There is promise of ample business in the form of matter usually sent by cable, of drawings, signatures, and other urgent mail matter, to make it pay. And as a challenge to Yankee enterprise in a field of great possibilities, if not too precise promise, it is something that can not wisely be ignored.

SPEAKING of the possibility of legislating people into virtue, Mr. Bryan a while ago cited the example of dueling. People went on fighting duels, he seemed to say, until some high-minded folk passed a law against it, and then they stopped. The facts are quite otherwise. In England and America, when dueling flourished, there was always plenty of law against it, and plenty of ably expressed opposition by thoughtful people. The trouble was that the law was too severe to be enforced. What ended dueling was not legislation at all, but a gradual change in the manners of the small class that engaged in it. There was plenty of law against dueling in Germany, where it existed under about the same sort of protest that football evokes here, as a form of indoor athletics. There is plenty of law against dueling in Latin countries, where it still survives as a more or less harmless way of ending an uncomfortable discussion. After all, instead of nursing a grievance against your even-Christian, it is perhaps more conducive to mental health to fire a pistol into the air somewhere in his neighborhood, and then shake hands and make up. It is only a gesture, perhaps; it is easily ridiculed, as when Sainte-Beuve insisted on fighting under an umbrella, or an American selected for weapons baseballs at fifteen paces; but it may serve wonderfully to purge the passions. It is something other than laws, something behind them of which they are the convenient and effective expression, that in the long run keeps society from doing things that are harmful to it. And, it is sometimes worth while to be reminded, life does not consist in not doing things, but in doing things—wisely.


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Editors
FABIAN FRANKLIN
HAROLD DE WOLF FULLER

# Bring It to a Head!

THERE is nothing strikingly novel in Mr. Hughes's letter to Senator Hale. Yet we are inclined to find in it a really hopeful significance. For the real thing that is going on in Washington is far less a process of examination and discussion than a process of alignment of forces; and Senator Hale's inquiry, taken in conjunction with Mr. Hughes's reply to it, indicates, to our mind, more of an approach to a reasonable alignment than anything else that has thus far come to the front. The essence of Senator Hale's letter is contained in this passage:

> Rather than take the Covenant as it now stands I am very certain that considerably more than one-third of the Senate would refuse to ratify the treaty altogether.
>
> As far as I am personally concerned I do not want to see this happen and I do want to see some plan devised whereby the United States may safely enter the League of Nations.

And the crux of Mr. Hughes's reply is to be found in what he says about the strategy of the situation in the Senate:

> If the Senate should adopt reservations by a majority vote, I assume that these will be made part of the proposed resolution of assent to the treaty, and the question will then be whether the Senate will give its assent, with these reservations, by the requisite two-thirds vote. If the proposed reservations are reasonable, the responsibility for the defeat of the treaty, if it is defeated, will lie with those who refuse the vote essential to the assent.

Upon this task—the task of formulating a set of reasonable reservations, reservations which would safeguard vital American concerns, which would be in substance as little disturbing to the Covenant as is compatible with this requirement, and in form interpretative and not amendatory—the Republican leaders should from this time forth firmly centre their efforts. For such a set of reservations there is every reason to believe that a majority vote can be obtained; and when this has once become evident the end of the long drawn-out struggle over the treaty ought to be in sight.

To the attainment of this object Mr. Hughes makes a valuable contribution in the form that he has proposed for the reservations. As regards the Monroe Doctrine and the control of what the United States regards as purely domestic questions the form does not greatly differ from what has been proposed by Mr. Root and others; in the matter of notice of withdrawal from the League, however, as well as in the matter of Article X, one observes a very definite exercise of lawyer-like skill in reducing to a minimum the possibility of objection from other signatory Powers. As to the right of withdrawal, Mr. Hughes's proposed resolution declares that the withdrawal of any Power shall take effect at the time specified in the notice, "notwithstanding any claim, charge or finding" of non-fulfilment of obligations; but it adds that "such withdrawal shall not release the Power from any debt or liability theretofore incurred"—thus embodying what may well be regarded as a substantial compliance with the provisions of the Covenant as it now stands. In the case of Article X, the broad statement of the first sentence goes, we believe, beyond the intent of Mr. Hughes, and should be modified; what follows is the essential thing—the declaration that the United States assumes no obligation to take any action in pursuance of the recommendation of the Council of the League unless such recommendation be approved by Congress. It has been confidently asserted, both by advocates and by opponents of the unreserved acceptance of the Covenant, that this is all that Article X means anyhow; and it has been asserted with equal confidence, both by advocates and by opponents, that the recommendation of the Council would carry with it an obligation that we could not disregard without a violation of our national honor. Mr. Hughes's proposal, therefore, is purely interpretative; and yet it completely removes the chief obstacle to the acceptance of Article X.

It is high time for the Republican floundering in this great matter to come to an end. It has been a most unedifying spectacle—not as an exhibition of excessive partisanhsip, as is so often charged, but of lack of intelligent leadership. Indeed, the floundering is rather a sign of non-partisanship than of partisanship. It is far easier to get together upon a scheme of partisan warfare than to come to an agreement as to a large public question upon its merits. The great variety of opinion and position manifested among Republican Senators is proof that at least a considerable proportion of them are acting according to their individual views of the subject. What has been lacking is an appreciation of the necessity, if anything is to be accomplished, of agreement upon some line of action which, while not satisfying every individual, would embody the essentials upon which all except a few extremists could agree. However, in fairness to the Republicans it is only just to say that the unity among the Democrats is to be ascribed not to wholehearted enthusiasm in behalf of the League, but to that support of the President in his position which is natural and inevitable in the circumstances. In and out of Congress there is probably a majority who feel that the League holds out the possibility of a great and beneficent future—who accept it as the best thing in sight, as something entitled to a fair chance, as an opening which we can not afford to turn down. But the number of those who hail it with joy as the sure harbinger of an era of peace and good will is so small as to be almost negligible. In these circumstances, it is but natural that any sacrifice of national tradition or policy which it demands should be viewed with a jealousy which would otherwise be out of place; and we may be sure that this feeling exists among Democrats as well as among Republicans.

What the President is going to do to bring about a solution of the problem is still far from clear. Thus far he has done nothing to change the situation that has existed these many months. Apparently he adheres to the purpose of making a great appeal to the people to stand by him against all opposition or criticism. What his chances are of bringing this attempt to a triumphant conclusion, he is perhaps better able to judge than any one else; yet in such enterprises he has been by no means uniformly successful. One instance of signal failure was that of his appeal on the eve of the Congressional elections of last year; but, properly viewed, the series of speeches he made at the outset of his peace-making mission in Europe is an instance no less impressive. In neither case did the sentiment to which he appealed suffice for his purpose. In the tour which he now contemplates his experience may be quite different. But he certainly runs a great risk. He may succeed in developing a state of public sentiment to which the opposition in the Senate will be compelled to bow; but if he fails the opposition will undoubtedly be strengthened, and made in many ways more dangerous. Would it not be the part of wisdom for him rather to watch his chance for a great stroke of conciliation and legitimate compromise? Indeed, is not such a chance open to him now? Would it not be a great stroke for him to accept Mr. Hughes's proposals, or something very like them? This it seems clear would take the ground from under the feet of the opposition. It may be that the psychological moment has not yet arrived for such a step; but in this direction we are convinced is to be found the way out of a situation which every succeeding week of its continuance will make more and more injurious to the prospects of our country and of the world. It is not only Congress, but also the President, that has not risen to the height of the occasion. Had he from the start set the note of a united endeavor in which Americans without distinction of party were called upon to bear an equal share, the whole development of affairs would have been very different. But it is not too late even now. By a single stroke of boldness and magnanimity, Mr. Wilson still has it in his power to assure not only the success of the treaty but the establishment of a feeling that that success was not a mere personal or party victory but an achievement of American patriotism and good sense.

# The Seamen's Strike

THE seamen's strike, which seriously interfered with shipping all along the Atlantic and Gulf coast for about three weeks, was a matter of direct concern not only to the American Steamship Company, chief spokesman for the private owners, but to the United States Government itself, which, through the Shipping Board, is the largest single owner, and will presently have more ocean-going ships than all the private owners put together. Mr. Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the Board, put the case very clearly before the National Marine League on March 27, when he said:

> The United States Government now owns 555 ocean-going steel cargo ships, aggregating 3,385,475 deadweight tons. In addition it has under contract 1,336 similar vessels of 9,275,006 deadweight tons. If our present programme be carried out there will be under the American flag next year 16,732,700 deadweight tons of ocean-going steel cargo and passenger ships. This fleet will be the equivalent of almost half of the merchant tonnage which plies the seas today under the flag of all nations combined. The Government will own about 70 per cent. of it.

In view of these facts, it is evident that there is now going on a tremendous expansion of our ocean-going marine, to say nothing of the multitude of smaller vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, on the great lakes and other waterways. Whether by accident or design, the International Seamen's Union of America chose the strategic moment for presenting its demands, not only because the new ships must be manned, but because of Europe's urgent need for foodstuffs, cotton, coal, and other necessaries of life. Then, too, there is in the interior a great scarcity of farm labor for the harvesting of our enormous crops, so that many seamen might have taken a vacation in the harvest fields, while their less enterprising shipmates drew strike pay for picket duty along the waterside of the coast cities.

As usual, there are several points of view from which the strikers' demands may be regarded, none of which gives absolute knowledge of the question—for it is many-sided. They asked for an all-round increase in wages of $15 a month, for an 8-hour day in port and the corresponding three-watch system at sea, for preference to union seamen, and for better accommodations on shipboard. Some of their demands were considered vital, while others were thrown in for good measure, as the unions knew quite well that they could not get everything at once.

The trouble began on July 10, with a strike of firemen, oilers, and watertenders, presently extending to the regular seamen until many ships were tied up all along the coast from Portland to Galveston. The private owners were not inclined to concede much, but the Shipping Board replied to the strikers' demands by telegram on July 13, fixing the wage of boatswains at $90 a month, able seamen $85, ordinary seamen $60, and boys for training purposes $40. A flat increase of $15 a month was granted to stewards and chief cooks, and a flat increase of $10 for all other positions, including firemen, oilers, and watertenders, who were the first to strike. Concessions were also granted to deck officers and engineers, but these are not members of the Seamen's Union. The Board agreed to the 8-hour day in port, but would not allow the three-watch system at sea, because that would increase the size of crews at a time of great shortage of sailors. The Board declared its intention to establish joint grievance committees in important ports to interpret rules and arrangements, but nothing was said about reference to unionists, except that other pending questions were to be subject to negotiation.

The American Steamship Company, on behalf of the private owners, accepted the decision of the Board under protest. The seamen, on the other hand, although fairly well satisfied with the wages allowed, determined to stand out for their original demands, especially the three-watch system and preference to unionists, and the strike continued for five weeks longer, after which the Shipping Board and the private owners made some further concessions and a settlement was effected on July 26. By the final terms boatswains are to receive $95, able seamen $85, ordinary seamen $65, boys $40; while the crew of the engine-room, the fireroom, and the steward's department are allowed proportionately more than the seamen. The three-watch system was allowed to wheelmen and lookout only, but preference to union seamen was not granted. The officers of the Union consider the strike a great success, and they have every reason for that opinion.

What the Seamen's Union wanted most of all was preference to unionists, but that is what they were unable to get. It was not a demand for the closed shop exactly, since non-union seamen might be employed when union men were not available; it was rather a preliminary measure designed to build up the membership of the Union, to increase its power, and to prepare the way for further demands at a later date.

True, the Seamen's Union had some such preference during the war, which it regards as a precedent that should obtain in time of peace. This, however, is a dangerous argument for the Union to use, for it proves too much. The preference in question was granted in consideration of special and dangerous war service; then it was demanded as a right without the offer of any equivalent whatever. Other precedents might be cited, but they all show that preference to unionists is a franchise or special privilege which generally is, and always should be, granted on the basis of a *quid pro quo*. Thus, under the late lamented Protocol in the New York garment trade, preference was allowed the Garment Workers because they agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. Similarly, in New Zealand the Arbitration Court commonly allows preference, but only to unions registered under the Arbitration Act and never to those which reserve the right to strike.

Recent events in Great Britain have called attention more than ever before to the importance of transportation as the keystone of the industrial arch, without which the whole fabric would collapse. The unions, especially the more radical of them, have made practical application of the circumstance, while the employers and the Government have allowed matters to drift until they are now confronted with the powerful and truculent Triple Alliance of miners, railwaymen, and transport workers, whose strangle-hold on British industry it seems almost impossible to release. The Triple Alliance could, if it wished, bring about a social revolution, or, at the least, a disastrous civil war. The situation there clearly shows the danger that may come to a whole country from the concentration of power in the hands of a group of special interests, without any guarantee that it will not be used for unsocial ends.

The I. W. W. of this country, confessedly revolutionary, well understand the relation of transportation to all the other industries of the country; and realizing that a general strike of the orthodox type is impracticable, they plan to reach the same end through a general strike of transport workers. In setting forth the merits of their scheme, James Scott, Acting-Secretary of the Marine Transport Workers' Industrial Union of the I. W. W., says:

> Remember, fellow workers, that transportation is the keystone of the present industrial system, and that when transportation stops, industry stops.

Our Seamen's Union, of course, is not revolutionary, and such leaders as Andrew Furuseth have no sympathy whatever with the I. W. W.; but they would be something more than human if, finding themselves in a position of great power, they were not tempted to misuse it when occasion offered. Besides, these relatively conservative leaders might at any time be displaced by others far more radical, and if the Shipping Board and the private owners—both trustees for the country at large—were to encourage the creation of such a power within the state without taking from it the right

to strike, they would be selling the country's birthright for a mess of pottage.

All this, of course, takes no account of the interests of non-union seamen, nor of the private owners and the Shipping Board, all of whom may have rights that should be considered. Indeed, both the Shipping Board and the private owners may find it hard to make both ends meet when the enormous fleet now building is put in commission, and when Great Britain and other countries resume their long interrupted traffic. The Seamen's Act of 1915, commonly known as the La Follette Act, but really the work of Mr. Furuseth and the Seamen's Union, has unquestionably increased the cost of operating American ships as compared with those of other countries, and it is still a question whether we shall be able to do our own ocean carrying without government subsidies or government ownership, both of which depend, in the last resort, upon the good will of the taxpayer.

## The Austrian Terms

UNQUESTIONABLY the most sensational result of the war is the reduction of Austria from one of the greatest of Empires to one of the smallest of republics. Three-quarters of the Reich has been shorn off for distribution to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Italy, and Rumania. Hungary is to be treated separately, with the prospect of being first conquered in a supplementary campaign. What remains of Austria is some 32,000 square miles, about the area of Portugal, with a population of 7,000,000, approximately that of Belgium before the war. Of the new states carved out of old Austria, the sole inheritor of the name is the most homogeneous, being almost exclusively German. Of the entire population nearly a third, 2,000,000, live, or lived, in Vienna. The land is largely mountainous and neither fertile nor rich in mineral resources. It can barely support its own people and surely can hardly maintain a world city like Vienna on the old basis.

The Republic of Austria is to bear the war damages and indemnities due in Italy and the Balkans, though presumably Hungary will eventually be made to share in the reparations. The sum is not fixed, but there are assurances that it will be justly apportioned according to Austria's ability to pay, while the payments will be completed within thirty years. Reparations of a particularly exemplary sort are to be exacted promptly in the shape of livestock to resupply the Italian and Balkan regions lately overrun by the Austrian armies.

All national debt existing before the war is to be assumed by the new states with Austria, the proportions to be adjusted by the League in conference with the parties concerned. The very thorny matter of the war debt is virtually let alone. All the new states are cleared of liability of any sort, nor can they as nations or individuals put Austria in distraint to pay the war bonds. She remains answerable for the war debt held outside of the former Empire. But this must be a negligible amount. The clause will have to be safeguarded, for it invites to fraudulent transfer of the war bonds to foreigners. The treaty provisions for the war debt virtually force repudiation, which is possibly the only way out of the tangle. In the matter of shipping destroyed during the war, Austria, like Germany, pays ton for ton. Such are the main provisions of the treaty. The very interesting arrangements for artistic indemnity and search of title as regards the Austrian art treasures we shall probably treat later in a separate article.

On the whole, the terms, while severe, are just and practical. They may be mitigated somewhat when the settlement with Hungary is made. They leave the Republic of Austria in a most anomalous condition. She holds one of the most splendid capitals in the world with very slight resources for its upkeep. The Republic is about in the position of a very poor young man who has fallen heir to an inalienable palace. Deprived of the great industrial districts of Galicia and Silesia, as of the fertile steppes of Hungary, Austria has for the moment, with sorely impaired capital, an almost embarrassing residuum of social prestige. She will naturally try to make up in trade and finance for what she now lacks in territory and natural resources. One would be glad to see her find compensations in the realities for her old factitious renown.

From the new Slavic states she has little to expect, at least until time shall have healed old grudges. They are likely to give their former tyrant few preferences of any sort. With Hungary, who, if not loving German Austria more, at least loves the Slavs less, the Republic of Austria is likely to resume close social and commercial relations. The way of rehabilitation distinctly lies in forming a new and perhaps unwritten *Ausgleich*. Despite the racial enmity, which is rather superficial, there is a real affinity between the German Austrian and the Hungarian temperament, the Germans having been to their benefit partially Magyarized. The real bond should work more potently now that the unnatural political union is annulled. Rumania is on the whole likely to seek her trade and personal relations rather with Austria and Hungary, states considerably influenced by Latin civilization, than with the new Slavic nations or Russia. It is very important for all Southeastern Europe that the European tradition represented by Austria should be maintained and strengthened. She will find her real future rather in winning back the sympathy of her former subjects than in the obvious course of turning to a German alliance.

For the present the League will prevent any such alliance between Austria and Germany. In the long run it may have to be permitted. That it is inevitable we do not see. So far as the realities of self-determination are concerned, a union between Austria and Bavaria, a renewal of the old South German Confederation, would be far more logical than the greater union. As Catholics and inheritors of a European tradition, Bavaria and Austria are far more akin than either is to Prussia. If the League works the miracle of removing international fears, such regroupings based on affections rather than on the need of protection should become possible. The natural and necessary endeavor of the Republic of Austria to build up a new sphere of influence in the regions it lately controlled through political force and guile will be watched with interest and even sympathy. The future of Europe is going to be largely determined, within a few years, on the soil that was once Austrian. If the states indulge in tariff wars and encourage racial hatreds, the partition of Austria will merely have extended the Balkans to the headwaters of the Rhine. For the League remains a gigantic task of arbitration and conciliation, a task in which the new Republic of Austria, with her extraordinary tradition of diplomacy, may be of great influence. No nation of modern times has cared more earnestly for prestige. The only lines along which it can be regained for Austria seem clear. As a province of Germany, she might be richer than she is likely to be in independence, but with the path to national renown completely closed.

## Housing and Prices

FOR sound sense and careful thinking we have seen few reports more deserving of commendation than that made by the Housing Committee of the Merchants' Association of New York. In such a problem as that which presses so acutely upon the population of our greatest city, it is almost as important to avoid going off on false scents as it is to work out genuine remedies. Indeed, it is more important; for if the public has its attention centered upon grievances that are unreal, or upon projects that can not possibly result in extensive improvement, not only can there be no chance of adopting any useful policy, but there will actually be paralysis of those spontaneous activities which are

# The Seamen's Strike

THE seamen's strike, which seriously interfered with shipping all along the Atlantic and Gulf coast for about three weeks, was a matter of direct concern not only to the American Steamship Company, chief spokesman for the private owners, but to the United States Government itself, which, through the Shipping Board, is the largest single owner, and will presently have more ocean-going ships than all the private owners put together. Mr. Edward N. Hurley, Chairman of the Board, put the case very clearly before the National Marine League on March 27, when he said:

> The United States Government now owns 555 ocean-going steel cargo ships, aggregating 3,385,475 deadweight tons. In addition it has under contract 1,336 similar vessels of 9,275,006 deadweight tons. If our present programme be carried out there will be under the American flag next year 16,732,700 deadweight tons of ocean-going steel cargo and passenger ships. This fleet will be the equivalent of almost half of the merchant tonnage which plies the seas today under the flag of all nations combined. The Government will own about 70 per cent. of it.

In view of these facts, it is evident that there is now going on a tremendous expansion of our ocean-going marine, to say nothing of the multitude of smaller vessels engaged in the coastwise trade, on the great lakes and other waterways. Whether by accident or design, the International Seamen's Union of America chose the strategic moment for presenting its demands, not only because the new ships must be manned, but because of Europe's urgent need for foodstuffs, cotton, coal, and other necessaries of life. Then, too, there is in the interior a great scarcity of farm labor for the harvesting of our enormous crops, so that many seamen might have taken a vacation in the harvest fields, while their less enterprising shipmates drew strike pay for picket duty along the waterside of the coast cities.

As usual, there are several points of view from which the strikers' demands may be regarded, none of which gives absolute knowledge of the question—for it is many-sided. They asked for an all-round increase in wages of $15 a month, for an 8-hour day in port and the corresponding three-watch system at sea, for preference to union seamen, and for better accommodations on shipboard. Some of their demands were considered vital, while others were thrown in for good measure, as the unions knew quite well that they could not get everything at once.

The trouble began on July 10, with a strike of firemen, oilers, and watertenders, presently extending to the regular seamen until many ships were tied up all along the coast from Portland to Galveston. The private owners were not inclined to concede much, but the Shipping Board replied to the strikers' demands by telegram on July 13, fixing the wage of boatswains at $90 a month, able seamen $85, ordinary seamen $60, and boys for training purposes $40. A flat increase of $15 a month was granted to stewards and chief cooks, and a flat increase of $10 for all other positions, including firemen, oilers, and watertenders, who were the first to strike. Concessions were also granted to deck officers and engineers, but these are not members of the Seamen's Union. The Board agreed to the 8-hour day in port, but would not allow the three-watch system at sea, because that would increase the size of crews at a time of great shortage of sailors. The Board declared its intention to establish joint grievance committees in important ports to interpret rules and arrangements, but nothing was said about reference to unionists, except that other pending questions were to be subject to negotiation.

The American Steamship Company, on behalf of the private owners, accepted the decision of the Board under protest. The seamen, on the other hand, although fairly well satisfied with the wages allowed, determined to stand out for their original demands, especially the three-watch system and preference to unionists, and the strike continued for five weeks longer, after which the Shipping Board and the private owners made some further concessions and a settlement was effected on July 26. By the final terms boatswains are to receive $95, able seamen $85, ordinary seamen $65, boys $40; while the crew of the engine-room, the fireroom, and the steward's department are allowed proportionately more than the seamen. The three-watch system was allowed to wheelmen and lookout only, but preference to union seamen was not granted. The officers of the Union consider the strike a great success, and they have every reason for that opinion.

What the Seamen's Union wanted most of all was preference to unionists, but that is what they were unable to get. It was not a demand for the closed shop exactly, since non-union seamen might be employed when union men were not available; it was rather a preliminary measure designed to build up the membership of the Union, to increase its power, and to prepare the way for further demands at a later date.

True, the Seamen's Union had some such preference during the war, which it regards as a precedent that should obtain in time of peace. This, however, is a dangerous argument for the Union to use, for it proves too much. The preference in question was granted in consideration of special and dangerous war service; then it was demanded as a right without the offer of any equivalent whatever. Other precedents might be cited, but they all show that preference to unionists is a franchise or special privilege which generally is, and always should be, granted on the basis of a *quid pro quo*. Thus, under the late lamented Protocol in the New York garment trade, preference was allowed the Garment Workers because they agreed to submit disputes to arbitration. Similarly, in New Zealand the Arbitration Court commonly allows preference, but only to unions registered under the Arbitration Act and never to those which reserve the right to strike.

Recent events in Great Britain have called attention more than ever before to the importance of transportation as the keystone of the industrial arch, without which the whole fabric would collapse. The unions, especially the more radical of them, have made practical application of the circumstance, while the employers and the Government have allowed matters to drift until they are now confronted with the powerful and truculent Triple Alliance of miners, railwaymen, and transport workers, whose strangle-hold on British industry it seems almost impossible to release. The Triple Alliance could, if it wished, bring about a social revolution, or, at the least, a disastrous civil war. The situation there clearly shows the danger that may come to a whole country from the concentration of power in the hands of a group of special interests, without any guarantee that it will not be used for unsocial ends.

The I. W. W. of this country, confessedly revolutionary, well understand the relation of transportation to all the other industries of the country; and realizing that a general strike of the orthodox type is impracticable, they plan to reach the same end through a general strike of transport workers. In setting forth the merits of their scheme, James Scott, Acting-Secretary of the Marine Transport Workers' Industrial Union of the I. W. W., says:

> Remember, fellow workers, that transportation is the keystone of the present industrial system, and that when transportation stops, industry stops.

Our Seamen's Union, of course, is not revolutionary, and such leaders as Andrew Furuseth have no sympathy whatever with the I. W. W.; but they would be something more than human if, finding themselves in a position of great power, they were not tempted to misuse it when occasion offered. Besides, these relatively conservative leaders might at any time be displaced by others far more radical, and if the Shipping Board and the private owners—both trustees for the country at large—were to encourage the creation of such a power within the state without taking from it the right

to strike, they would be selling the country's birthright for a mess of pottage.

All this, of course, takes no account of the interests of non-union seamen, nor of the private owners and the Shipping Board, all of whom may have rights that should be considered. Indeed, both the Shipping Board and the private owners may find it hard to make both ends meet when the enormous fleet now building is put in commission, and when Great Britain and other countries resume their long interrupted traffic. The Seamen's Act of 1915, commonly known as the La Follette Act, but really the work of Mr. Furuseth and the Seamen's Union, has unquestionably increased the cost of operating American ships as compared with those of other countries, and it is still a question whether we shall be able to do our own ocean carrying without government subsidies or government ownership, both of which depend, in the last resort, upon the good will of the taxpayer.

## The Austrian Terms

UNQUESTIONABLY the most sensational result of the war is the reduction of Austria from one of the greatest of Empires to one of the smallest of republics. Three-quarters of the Reich has been shorn off for distribution to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Jugoslavia, Italy, and Rumania. Hungary is to be treated separately, with the prospect of being first conquered in a supplementary campaign. What remains of Austria is some 32,000 square miles, about the area of Portugal, with a population of 7,000,000, approximately that of Belgium before the war. Of the new states carved out of old Austria, the sole inheritor of the name is the most homogeneous, being almost exclusively German. Of the entire population nearly a third, 2,000,000, live, or lived, in Vienna. The land is largely mountainous and neither fertile nor rich in mineral resources. It can barely support its own people and surely can hardly maintain a world city like Vienna on the old basis.

The Republic of Austria is to bear the war damages and indemnities due in Italy and the Balkans, though presumably Hungary will eventually be made to share in the reparations. The sum is not fixed, but there are assurances that it will be justly apportioned according to Austria's ability to pay, while the payments will be completed within thirty years. Reparations of a particularly exemplary sort are to be exacted promptly in the shape of livestock to resupply the Italian and Balkan regions lately overrun by the Austrian armies.

All national debt existing before the war is to be assumed by the new states with Austria, the proportions to be adjusted by the League in conference with the parties concerned. The very thorny matter of the war debt is virtually let alone. All the new states are cleared of liability of any sort, nor can they as nations or individuals put Austria in distraint to pay the war bonds. She remains answerable for the war debt held outside of the former Empire. But this must be a negligible amount. The clause will have to be safeguarded, for it invites to fraudulent transfer of the war bonds to foreigners. The treaty provisions for the war debt virtually force repudiation, which is possibly the only way out of the tangle. In the matter of shipping destroyed during the war, Austria, like Germany, pays ton for ton. Such are the main provisions of the treaty. The very interesting arrangements for artistic indemnity and search of title as regards the Austrian art treasures we shall probably treat later in a separate article.

On the whole, the terms, while severe, are just and practical. They may be mitigated somewhat when the settlement with Hungary is made. They leave the Republic of Austria in a most anomalous condition. She holds one of the most splendid capitals in the world with very slight resources for its upkeep. The Republic is about in the position of a very poor young man who has fallen heir to an inalienable palace. Deprived of the great industrial districts of Galicia and Silesia, as of the fertile steppes of Hungary, Austria has for the moment, with sorely impaired capital, an almost embarrassing residuum of social prestige. She will naturally try to make up in trade and finance for what she now lacks in territory and natural resources. One would be glad to see her find compensations in the realities for her old factitious renown.

From the new Slavic states she has little to expect, at least until time shall have healed old grudges. They are likely to give their former tyrant few preferences of any sort. With Hungary, who, if not loving German Austria more, at least loves the Slavs less, the Republic of Austria is likely to resume close social and commercial relations. The way of rehabilitation distinctly lies in forming a new and perhaps unwritten *Ausgleich*. Despite the racial enmity, which is rather superficial, there is a real affinity between the German Austrian and the Hungarian temperament, the Germans having been to their benefit partially Magyarized. The real bond should work more potently now that the unnatural political union is annulled. Rumania is on the whole likely to seek her trade and personal relations rather with Austria and Hungary, states considerably influenced by Latin civilization, than with the new Slavic nations or Russia. It is very important for all Southeastern Europe that the European tradition represented by Austria should be maintained and strengthened. She will find her real future rather in winning back the sympathy of her former subjects than in the obvious course of turning to a German alliance.

For the present the League will prevent any such alliance between Austria and Germany. In the long run it may have to be permitted. That it is inevitable we do not see. So far as the realities of self-determination are concerned, a union between Austria and Bavaria, a renewal of the old South German Confederation, would be far more logical than the greater union. As Catholics and inheritors of a European tradition, Bavaria and Austria are far more akin than either is to Prussia. If the League works the miracle of removing international fears, such regroupings based on affections rather than on the need of protection should become possible. The natural and necessary endeavor of the Republic of Austria to build up a new sphere of influence in the regions it lately controlled through political force and guile will be watched with interest and even sympathy. The future of Europe is going to be largely determined, within a few years, on the soil that was once Austrian. If the states indulge in tariff wars and encourage racial hatreds, the partition of Austria will merely have extended the Balkans to the headwaters of the Rhine. For the League remains a gigantic task of arbitration and conciliation, a task in which the new Republic of Austria, with her extraordinary tradition of diplomacy, may be of great influence. No nation of modern times has cared more earnestly for prestige. The only lines along which it can be regained for Austria seem clear. As a province of Germany, she might be richer than she is likely to be in independence, but with the path to national renown completely closed.

## Housing and Prices

FOR sound sense and careful thinking we have seen few reports more deserving of commendation than that made by the Housing Committee of the Merchants' Association of New York. In such a problem as that which presses so acutely upon the population of our greatest city, it is almost as important to avoid going off on false scents as it is to work out genuine remedies. Indeed, it is more important; for if the public has its attention centered upon grievances that are unreal, or upon projects that can not possibly result in extensive improvement, not only can there be no chance of adopting any useful policy, but there will actually be paralysis of those spontaneous activities which are

independent of any policy at all. The Merchants' Association report has the great merit of unflinchingly pointing out the real elements in the situation, and of showing the baseless character of some of the ideas that are most current concerning it. The fact that most of the points of this nature made in the report are common property among people who understand the subject, does not lessen the value of the firm and lucid presentation of them in the report.

The very first thing to be recognized, and the thing never to be lost sight of, is that the only way to solve the housing problem is to build houses. Profiteer-hunting may be more interesting, and is certainly more exciting, than a sober tackling of the question of supply; but, as is pointed out in the report, not only is the practice of "profiteering" a very minor element in the case, but what little good in the way of easing of the situation can be accomplished by the hunting down of actual profiteers is far more than balanced by the discouragement of legitimate building enterprise through fear of the odium which these proceedings tend to attach to houseowners in general. This is not to say that a just and sober endeavor should not be made to stop abuses; the trouble is with the undiscriminating spirit of a general crusade into which such agitations are so apt to fall. If we are to have more houses, we must encourage builders; and we do not encourage them when we seek to prevent those who already own houses from obtaining the return which naturally comes to them upon business principles. You may intimidate a man here and there into taking less rent than the business conditions of the time warrant; but you won't intimidate very many, and you *will* prevent a great many others from going into a business which you have virtually blacklisted.

This, however, is only one point of the committee's report. It finds the impediments to the construction of the necessary housing to consist chiefly in two things:

I. Lack of money for building operations caused by
(a) Insufficient return on mortgages due to Federal taxes.
(b) Insufficient return on operation of buildings, and apparent hostility of the public to the collection by the owner of a sufficient return, and
II. Doubt as to the continuance of the prevailing high prices of building construction, and reluctance to build now while they do prevail.

On the subject of taxation the committee urges exemption from income taxes of the revenue from real estate mortgages up to an aggregate amount of forty thousand dollars in the hands of any one individual. A recommendation of this general nature was made some time ago by the joint committee on housing of the New York State Legislature. As stated in the *Review* at the time, such exemption would be justified on the ground of urgent public necessity, and is also in keeping with existing legislation in the matter of farm loans. The degree in which this might be expected to be helpful is shown in the Merchants' Association Committee's report to be greater than might at first thought be supposed, and it is to be hoped that the measure will be urged upon Congress.

The question of high prices of building construction belongs in a different domain, and all that the committee or anybody else can do in regard to it is to express a judgment which might have influence on practical men. The committee believes, in common with almost all economists and business men who have studied the question, that there is no prospect of a general lowering of prices for a long time to come. The world is on a new price level, caused not by extortionate practices, or the plots of evil-minded persons, but by the enormous expansion of credit and of paper currency throughout the world, together with the diversion of a large part of the world's energy from fruitful productive enterprises to the purposes of war making. To some extent there should be a recoil in the direction of lowered prices through the restoration of normal productive activities. But the great factor of monetary inflation is with us to stay, certainly for a long time, and even the other process will be slow in making any marked impression upon prices. Moreover, while wages of labor have in some directions gone beyond even the great rise in the level of prices, labor on the whole, especially if we take into account the salaried as well as the wage-earning classes, has not caught up with that level. Accordingly, in the adjustments that remain to be made, there is every reason to expect, for a long time to come, increases in cost of production that will tend to cancel those decreases which will take place where scarcity of labor has run wages up to extortionate heights. Take it all in all, it is idle for persons contemplating building to wait for a drop in building costs that is certainly far off, when returns in the shape of rent, for a series of years at least, will be on an unusually high scale.

The whole situation offers a typical example of the way in which economic hardships tend to be lessened not by crying out against them, nor by resorting to repressive legislation, but by letting economic forces do their natural work. The way to reduce rents—that is, to reduce them on a large scale, and not merely in the case of an instance here and there—is to let them take their course. If you say you won't tolerate rents that strike you as exorbitant, in face of the plain fact that they are not high enough to tempt capital into taking advantage of them by going into building enterprise, you will be cutting off your one recourse. Let the temptation stand, and you may for a while have to pay rents that are beyond the natural return of capital, but you won't do it indefinitely because capital won't let you. On the other hand, if capital, already shy on account of the inherent difficulties of the case, is further frightened by unreasoning denunciations or threats, capital will keep out of the field; and no substitute for it will be supplied by anything that the denunciators or threateners will undertake to do in the premises.

## Disorganizing the Army

THE American Army, which has given a good acount of its foes, might well pray to be delivered from its friends. Its necessary reduction and reorganization is being effected by a simple process of Congressional starvation. Secretary Baker made perfunctory recommendations that the Regular Army be kept at 506,000, pending consideration of our permanent establishment. The proposal was in itself reasonable. It permitted the retention of a complete organization on a working basis. It afforded units sufficiently large to give proper tactical training to officers and enlisted force. It gave a chance for the army to avail itself of the new officer material developed in the war. Finally it furnished a slight margin of force to be used if our new responsibilities should require.

Mr. Baker, it seems to us, was much at fault in not pressing his recommendations. He has yielded readily to Congressional parsimony. It is to be feared that both the President and the Secretary of War make a virtue of neglecting army matters as a pledge of sincere devotion to the principle of disarmament. In any case Mr. Baker seems to have accepted the decision of a stupidly economical Cóngress, his recent appearance before the House Commitee being too late to undo the mischief.

The Army is being reduced by the simple process of cutting the force to fit the appropriations. All technical services, such as aviation, tanks, and chemical warfare, must be limited to a depot basis, without provision either for active practice or for investigation. The personnel for these special services must be drawn from the regular force, which is quickly to be reduced to 180,000. About 23,000 temporary officers, the flower of the volunteer service, who have applied for permanent commissions, must be discharged. We have fairly in sight once more the platoon of fifty masquerading as a company with a major in charge, and the company of two hun-

dred figuring as a regiment and commanded by a brigadier-general. In short, the army is being allowed to slip back to pre-war conditions at a rate which is in itself most demoralizing.

Now all this is simply bad business. It is saving a dollar now to spend a hundred later. Under whatever world conditions, we shall have to have an army. Membership in the League of Nations will involve contingent military obligations of a serious sort, to which our prospective force is quite inadequate. Simply as a matter of sound political tactics, the friends of the Covenant should seek to bring this nation into the League with a normal military establishment. It will hardly please even the more enthusiastic champions of the League to be asked to increase the army greatly as a result of League membership. But precisely that is likely to happen as a consequence of the failure of the Administration to defend the business interests of the nation that are involved in the regular army.

Senator Chamberlain, formerly one of the most enlightened friends of the army, now deals with best of intentions a sore blow to our morale. *Et tu Brute!* He has introduced a bill granting complete amnesty to all soldiers convicted of purely military offences. One and all, they are to have the reward of the faithful soldier, honorable discharge. Deserters are to have their forfeited citizenship restored. This bill follows close upon action of a special clemency commission which has cut all sentences by three-quarters and has already strained the quality of mercy to the limit. The proposed general amnesty would reduce the value of an honorable discharge. It would annul the immemorial regulations which rightly allot to a military offender who has not by subsequent exemplary conduct cleared his record only an ordinary discharge. Finally, this general jail delivery would discredit unfairly our military courts for a long future. Whoever has misled Senator Chamberlain has done a disservice to the army. The bill should be allowed to die in committee.

There impends a great task of reorganizing the military system of the United States. It wants considerate and prolonged debate. It can not be undertaken until our relation to the League of Nations is fixed. What is being done now, through the ignorant parsimony of Congress and the slackness of the Administration, will make the ultimate reorganization immensely more difficult and costly than it need be. Sometimes we wish for a few competent managers at Washington who should be chiefly concerned with doing the business defined in their oath of office. When Mr. Baker lets army reduction take care of itself he is merely reducing the security of the nation and prospectively increasing its expenses.

# A Great Physician

THE opening of the Johns Hopkins Medical School marked an epoch in medical education, and in the progress of medical science and practice, in America. The standard there so boldly set, and so firmly adhered to, has since become dominant in leading institutions, old and new, in all parts of the country; and now it is only by an effort of memory that we can recall how far we were from any such standard, and how doubtful seemed its prospect of successful establishment, when the new project was launched thirty years ago. In that great work Dr. Osler was a leading figure; and it is therefore matter of national interest that, on the occasion of his seventieth birthday, there is presented a survey of his life and work, and an account of his rare and picturesque personality. To this object the July issue of the *Bulletin* of the Johns Hopkins Hospital is entirely devoted. It is natural that such a tribute should have been paid him by his former colleagues and disciples; but in doing so they have rendered a service to all who are capable of appreciating the highest possibilities of a great physician, teacher, and leader.

The fifty quarto pages of the *Bulletin* comprise papers dealing with every phase of Osler's many-sided activity—Osler as Chief of the Medical Clinic, Osler the Teacher, Osler and Patient, Osler as a Citizen and his relation to the Tuberculosis Crusade in Maryland, Osler's Literary Style, are five of the eighteen heads—and wind up with a copious bibliography. A perusal of these papers can not fail to impress any one with a sense both of the largeness of Osler's nature and the fruitfulness of his work; but the very division of the subject interferes with the obtaining of that rounded picture of the man which a general account from a single hand might more successfully convey. Fortunately, however, the article contributed by Dr. W. S. Thayer, the present holder of Osler's chair, contains a characterization which those who have known Osler will recognize as truthful, and which will give to those who have not had that privilege a vivid realization of a personality that it is good to hear about. After laying down the rules that should guide a physician and teacher, Dr. Thayer goes on in a passage which, though almost too long to quote, it would be a pity to abridge:

> If you can practice consistently all this—and then, if you can bring into corridor and ward a light, springing step, a kindly glance, a bright word to every one you meet, arm passed within arm or thrown over the shoulder of the happy student or colleague; a quick, droll, epigrammatic question, observation or appellation, that puts the patient at his ease or brings a pleased blush to the face of the nurse; an apprehension that grasps in a minute the kernel of the situation, and a memory teeming with instances and examples that throw light on the question; an unusual power of succinct statement and picturesque expression, exercised quietly, modestly, and wholly without sensation; if you can bring into the lecture room an air of perfect simplicity and directness, and, behind it all, have an ever-ready store of the most apt and sometimes surprising interjections that so light up and emphasize that which you are setting forth that no one in the room can forget it; if you can enter the sick-room with a song and an epigram, an air of gaiety, an atmosphere that lifts the invalid instantly out of his ills, that produces in the waiting hypochrondriac so pleasing a confusion of thought that the written list of questions and complaints, carefully compiled and treasured for the moment of the visit, is almost invariably forgotten; if the joy of your visit can make half a ward forget the symptoms that it *fancied* were important, until you are gone; if you can truly love your fellow, and, having said evil of no man, be loved by all; if you can select a wife with a heart as big as your own, whose generous welcome makes your tea-table a Mecca—if you can do all this, you may begin to be to others the teacher that "the chief" is to us!

Happy the man to whom such a tribute can be honestly paid!

Turning from Osler to the achievement at Baltimore in which he played so important a part, it is worth while to take every opportunity to emphasize the cardinal fact about it—the fact that it was big men, not big money, that did the work. The Johns Hopkins Medical School did enjoy the advantage of having a great hospital—the Johns Hopkins Hospital—at its disposal; the foresight of the founder and his advisers had from the beginning provided that the Hospital should be an integral part of the Medical School. But the endowment of the Medical School itself was only half a million dollars, which it owed to the liberality of Miss Garrett and her devotion to the cause of women's education—the admission of women on equal terms with men having been made an essential condition of her gift. It was the big men—Welch, Osler, Halsted, Kelly—that drew to Johns Hopkins the pick of the medical students of the country; it was the inspiration of these men, and not buildings or apparatus, that made the Baltimore school the focus of such energetic and fruitful enthusiasm as had never before been known in this country, and as has so largely contributed to the growth of a like spirit in our medical schools in general. The lesson is not that money is of no importance in universities. It is of very great importance; much money must, in the present development of science, be spent upon apparatus as well as upon men. But no amount of apparatus can accomplish great things if you haven't big men; while big men may accomplish great things though they have at their disposal no extraordinary supply of money or apparatus.

# Sticking Labels on Frenchmen

"CLEMENCEAU is a Reactionary—he doesn't know what it is to be a Radical," said one American Peace Conference correspondent.

"Pichon is an Imperialist," added another. "The Birmingham *Post* in England says the French Foreign Office is the last survivor of the Old Régime."

"French Government and French people are out for our money," cried a third.

"The French husband is the worst in the world, as everybody knows," concluded the lady correspondent who had just been protesting that she was not a German sympathizer.

That settled the hash of France for one day. There is nothing like having fixed ideas—and labels with which to make the ideas stick.

In the world's great bitterness nothing has done more to poison public opinion in England and America than this plastering of labels on the French people's backs. In the difficult working out of peace it still goes on. It serves the purpose of those who are unwilling that any restoration of devastated France and Belgium should touch the prosperity of the German people who have wrought the ruin. It is wound up in the efforts of those who, to save Germany, would go further and see half our civilization changed in the revolutionary twinkling of an eye.

Lord Curzon may not be up to any vital evolution of the human society into which he was born, but he reduced the only present question to its lowest common-sense denominator when speaking to the House of Lords, July 5, on the Peace Treaty of Versailles:

"As to the proposal to give a guarantee to France against aggression, France has been devastated twice in the last fifty years. By geographical position she holds the frontiers of civilization, and all the nations of the world owe their present liberty and security to her. It is right that those who profit by these sacrifices should guarantee France against the necessity of repeating them."

A good example of uncertainty in the application of labels was given a few days later by General Smuts in a speech to an English political audience. He was explaining the limits of his approval of the Peace Treaty, to which he was a party. "Clemenceau called us British delegates—fourteen savages." It is doubtful if the General understood, and it is certain his hearers would not understand, that this lumping together of delegates from the Mother Country and her Dominions—Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, South Africa—contained no allusion to red Indians. *Sauvages*—which M. Clemenceau meant to say—is French political slang for men who, in Parliament or in their party, take each his solitary way and act without solidarity like wild men of the woods.

A really mischievous application of labels to the French people—and to some others—is the current use of the word "proletariat" and even of the word "people."

Counting roughly, one-half of the population of France is still made up of peasants or workers of the land; one-fourth is *bourgeois*, or property-holders of towns; and the remaining fourth comprises workmen living by day's wages. The nobility has done brilliantly during the war, but it is inconsiderable in numbers—one to a hundred of the population at most—and, being without legal standing or other separation from the common run of mortals than a certain society recognition, it has to be counted with the *bourgeois*. High-salaried men with prospects are *bourgeois*, low-salaried men without hope gravitate the other way. *Intellectuels*, less numerous than nobles, are like the British Peace Delegates—"savages."

Peasants, or the agricultural class, gave three-fourths of the French soldiers actually fighting in the war. Bourgeois, nobles, clergy, gave what they had. Workmen oftener than other classes were kept back in munitions factories, but otherwise they fought with the rest.

All slept in the swaths when the night was falling.

All these in war were the French people, birds of a feather flocking together to defend their common existence as a nation. From the labels attached by a certain foreign press, it might be thought that only workmen for day's wages are proletariat or people.

So far as the primitive sense of the name proletariat is concerned, such workmen in France have few more children than the *bourgeois*. However it may be in other countries, in French cities there is always an inordinately large proportion of unmarried workmen and this is not favorable to offspring. Now as in the past France has to look to her peasants for the coming generations and even for a constant supply of industrial workmen. One of the worst confusions resulting from this misuse of labels is forgetfulness or plain ignorance of the essential fact in all French history—Revolutionary or not—that France is preponderantly an agricultural country. If she had been, like England, without her own grain and her own cattle, she could never have held out for one year of war.

The confusion of labels becomes positive abuse when they are misused in political slang. French Socialists are the French People, so are the Syndicalists and the Anarchists—but the peasants whom even Jaurès could never make to run with either are not People.

In the French Republic the maximum electoral strength of workmen in this restricted proletariat sense is 4,000,000 votes. Like other Frenchmen, many can not or do not vote and surprisingly many vote like the *bourgeois* for whom they work and to whose ranks they are aspiring as never before. The entire vote for Socialist candidates to Parliament does not exceed 1,200,000, while the entire General Confederation of Labor which tries to unite all Syndicalists or Labor Unionists that go in for the Socialist conflict of classes or revolutionary methods has never reached 400,000 members. The "Free" or unattached Syndicalists, who are often held together by religion and are very uncertain politically, are nearly as numerous. Yet Socialists and Syndicalists only are counted as the French People when foreigners pronounce their oracles on popular government in France.

The present particular instance is most flagrant. In relation to the Peace Treaty the French People has come to mean to many in England and America that fraction of the Socialist party which has for its member of Parliament in a Seine constituency Jean Longuet, grandson of Karl Marx. In like manner, the *Intellectuels* of France have been supposed to be represented by a manifesto of which the only signature known to publishers, book-sellers, or readers was that of Henry Barbusse—doubtless *magni nominis umbra*, but a shadow only. And to such as these, fractions of a fraction, Germans entrust their hopes of a near revision of peace.

Once there was the People—Terror gave it birth—
Once there was the People and it made a hell of earth.

Perhaps Kipling would find it hard under present circumstances to situate such verses, and Tennyson, who was also a poet, might not find in Paris nowadays "the red fool-fury of the Seine." Perhaps the present confused count of Bolsheviki rests on labels similarly reckless of figures and facts.

Another flagrant instance is the use of the word "Republic." Out of some six hundred members of the French Parliament who are elected by universal suffrage, six may have declared themselves in favor of some kind of monarchy when it shall become possible, and a dozen may assume the name of "Liberal Republican" to show that, while they are of the ancient religion, they have accepted the modern political régime. Yet periodically for those to whom the People is a fragment of the population—the Republic is in danger.

In a memorable session of the Cham-

ber of Deputies, July 7, 1919, Aristide Briand spoke his mind on this point, brought out acutely by the change in the electoral system which was being voted. He is also a "savage"—an independent Socialist who has never entered the party unified by Jaurès, but has been kept in Parliament by the workmen—real people they—of the factory centre of Saint-Etienne. "I do not believe the Republic can be put in danger. Issuing from this war in which she has been so fully identified with France, the Republic has a strength against which all attacks would be broken."

STODDARD DEWEY

*Paris, July* 10

# China's Reaction to the Shantung Settlement

THE decision made by the Peace Conference at Paris to transfer Kiaochow and all German rights in the province of Shantung to Japan served as a signal for an intensely nationalistic movement throughout China. This movement has manifested itself largely in opposition to certain Chinese officials at Peking who were said to have been pro-Japanese and responsible for Japan's enormous ascendency in China in recent years, in anti-Japanese activities, and above all in a general awakening to the urgency of national self-defense. The Chinese people have simply plunged into another vortex of frenzied and violent emotionalism, as they have often done since their contact with aggressive foreign Powers. The present outburst seems, however, more frenzied and violent than any they have indulged in before, not excepting the display of emotional intensity in the days of the famous Twenty-one Demands.

Self-chastisement is a pronounced Chinese characteristic. When anything goes wrong with them, the Chinese first of all bring themselves to account and, in the case of national affairs, undertake a search for the foes within, much as the late Col. Roosevelt conducted his warfare upon the hyphenates. Accordingly, on May 4 several hundred students of the metropolitan colleges and schools, under the leadership of the students of the Government University, rushed to the house of the Minister of Communications, Tsao Yu-ling, and there beat him and his two friends, the one the then Chinese Minister and the other an ex-Chinese Minister to Tokio, who were dining at the house. The house was partly burned by the students. Thirty-one of the defiant youths fell into the hands of the police. Immediately the whole country rose with one voice to defend the action of the students, and demanded punishment, and even execution, for the three officials above mentioned. After much popular clamor and after the resignation of the Minister and the Vice-Minister of Education and of the Chancellor of the Government University as an acknowledgment of their failure to restrain the students, but in reality as a protest against the arrest, the thirty-one youthful heroes were finally released and acclaimed as patriots. But the Government did not discharge the three officials until almost all branches of business throughout the country had been suspended for three days as a national protest.

Meanwhile the agitation for boycotting Japanese goods spread like wildfire. Mass meetings of all classes of citizens were held, Japanese goods were burned, and violent anti-Japanese speeches were made. Several students in the leading cities, while engaged in anti-Japanese demonstrations, are reported to have died of wounds received from the police.

May 7, the anniversary of the day four years before on which China received from Japan the Twenty-one Demands, was observed everywhere this year as a day of national mourning, with heightened sorrow and hatred. Even more sensitive to the Japanese aggressions than the people at home were the Chinese students residing in Japan, who numbered several thousand. Hundreds of them have returned to China, with the special purpose of leading the nation-wide movement against the Island Empire.

But you can not resist the enemy with mere feeling, or as the Chinese would say, with empty fist. The boycott movement is but passive resistance and not a solution for the problem of the Japanese menace. Nothing short of the creation of a strong national army, to replace the existing personal armies of the selfish and truculent military governors, will make the voice of the Chinese people heard in international dealings, or enable them to redress their grievances. At present, universal military training is urged as the only means to safeguard the territorial and other rights of the nation. And, with the fear of impending domination of Shantung by Japan, the more thoughtful Chinese have realized, perhaps for the first time, that what is even more important than territories and political and economic rights is the great ancient culture of their country. Shantung, being the birthplace of Confucius and the Jerusalem of China, should not be debased by alien rule, especially by the rule of a country which has apparently outraged Confucianism, the creed of peace and righteousness. The thought of Shantung necessarily leads to the consideration of the whole country not merely as a vast land of natural resources and material wealth upon which the teeming millions depend for subsistence, but as a cherished historic home, rich in memories and achievements of the great sages and poets and artists. The superior man in China may be pardoned for being somewhat apathetic concerning the railroad and mining concessions which his Government is obliged to grant to foreigners, but he should be ready to die for the defense of the ideals and institutions which he has inherited from the great men of his race. The hope of China then lies in the rise of a vigorous but intelligent and balanced idea of nationality in which the masses and the educated can come together for the preservation of their spiritual as well as their material heritage.

The Chinese failure to steer a proper course during the past few years has been due to lack of sound political leadership. With the European Powers fighting among themselves, the Chinese were temporarily relieved from outside pressure and were in a position to put their house in order and make themselves a self-reliant and strong nation to remove the danger of further humiliation after the war. Instead of so doing, their politicians and militarists have all along revelled in the luxuries of unmolested holiday rowdyism, with the Japanese as an "impartial" spectator surreptitiously cheering and encouraging now one side and now the other. And the people at large were captivated by the romantic picture that a certain type of statesman in the West gave of the world which was to evolve out of the then prevailing chaos and barbarism. President Wilson's war addresses, translated into Chinese by a Ph.D. of Columbia University, ran through many editions. On the signing of the armistice last November, lantern processions were held everywhere by the students to celebrate what they termed the "triumph of humanitarianism." From that time on, they thought, justice and right would reign everywhere, and China would be accorded all the justice due her without the need of constant military preparation. Consequently, when the Shantung settlement was announced, the blow to the Chinese was a severe one. In unison with the disconcerted votaries of the "New Order" in the West, the Chinese now look upon President Wilson as a "lost leader."

But perhaps their disappointment in America is greater than the disillusion which followed the Allied professions. It is well to remember that China joined the war on the Allied side at the invita-

tion of America, the nation always considered as her most trusted friend. With the help of America at the peace table, China felt pretty sure of the chance to repudiate the pretensions of Japan. No doubt President Wilson and the other American delegates did their best to stand by China, but the circumstances and necessity which accounted for their final yielding can not be fully appreciated by the Chinese. Mortals as they are, the Chinese naturally feel some sort of embarrassment and discomfiture towards a friend who seems to have left them in the lurch. A prominent American weekly in Shanghai has recently gone so far as to remark that the Shantung decision has greatly lowered the prestige of Chinese students returned from America, who were the loudest and the most enthusiastic vouchers for America's friendship.

It is unnecessary here to review the story of Kiaochow. There may be oral assurances by Japan that she will restore the Shantung Peninsula to China, with the retention of only certain economic rights in Shantung formerly enjoyed by Germany. But China knows too well from past experience the value of merely oral assurances made by Japanese diplomats. She can not rest assured, unless it is clearly and definitely written down in the peace treaty, that Japan will return Kiaochow and the Shantung rights either immediately or within a short specified time. Failing in this, China will have nothing definite to base her claims upon in the League of Nations, even if we grant that this much vaunted international machinery will be able to overrule the imperialistic ambitions of expansive modern nations.

For the plain truth is that modern Japan, like most other modern nations, is out for unlimited expansion. Nothing is so evident as her failure to learn anything from the war. Her so-called "idealistic" statesmen have sought to regenerate mankind by a piece of political machinery and to establish universal brotherhood by some means of coöperative pursuit of material interests. Meanwhile the realists in statecraft outwit the "idealists" and make tools of them. Japan has never cared for any such political scheme as the "idealists" have proposed. For she has become a true disciple of the West in that she is thoroughly saturated with the expansive ideas which the teachings of modern history and economics and science have given her. Over-population is the bogey and racial superiority the battle-cry of her statesmen. China, together with certain other "backward nations," is rapidly becoming "Japan's burden." Japan, too, it seems, has a "mission" to fulfill. The importation of morphia in large quantities through the Japanese post offices in China, the secret encouragement of the local bandits in Shantung, the bribing and cajoling of certain Chinese officials at Peking into granting large economic privileges, and the furnishing of large loans to both the Northern and Southern Governments to prolong the civil strife and obstruct political unity and reform in China—these are some of the features of Japan's programme in her attempt to impose her "superior culture" and fulfill her "mission" in the Asiatic mainland.

KUANG-TI MAY

# The American Commission in Syria

The American Commission whose business is to investigate the Syrian situation and report to the Peace Conference at Paris is now sojourning in Syria and conducting what seems to be a plebiscite based on the principle of self-determination. It will have no trouble in finding out what the people really want; but, having found out, will it prevail upon the Allies to act upon its report?

Much has been written about the historic claims, the vested interests, the treaty rights of this or that European Power in Syria; but little or no consideration has been given to the claims, the interests, and the rights of the people themselves. True, they are various and conflicting. But hitherto no attempt has been made to discover a possibility at least of reconciliation, even though Syria has always been the object of the solicitude, the protection—or the subtle exploitation—of one or more of the European Powers. It is even more so to-day.

For though it be religiously a maze of cross-currents, politically, inchoate and nebulous, it is economically a land of promise. As it was in the past, before the Suez Canal was built, Syria is to become again the gate to the East. In recent years, subject alike to Turkefying and modernizing influences, it was the backyard, so to speak, of Oriental civilization and the vestibule of the civilization of Europe. And it is destined to be the melting pot of both. But can it become a self-governing state? Can the people, Mohammedans and Christians and Jews and Druses, coöperate in a common cause, strive to achieve nationality? Or are they to be kept apart from each other under separate autonomies and to remain divided politically as well as religiously?

The findings of the American Commission will have a bearing upon these questions. But will they have any influence on the action of the two Governments that are most interested in Syria to-day? The Turk, who was the principal agent of division, is gone. But are the Allies, who have freed the country of his criminal rule, going to divide it into principalities and states independent of each other—into different protectorates rather, or various spheres of influence and control? Instead of one government, the country to-day has three. They are military and provisional, of course. But the fact that the English are now occupying Palestine; the Arabs, Damascus; the French, Beirut and the coast, foreshadows an international project for the creation of a number of small weak states on what is called "the sphere of influence" plan, which will offer them protection and encourage their growth and development.

How do the people of the land feel about this? To answer this question, it is necessary to know who the people are. Approximately, two-thirds of the population are Mohammedans; about five per cent. of the other third are Jews; the rest are Christians of various sects and prejudices—and complaints. Racially, they are one people, speaking one language—Arabic. Politically, they are a dozen peoples, speaking a dozen languages. The minorities, whether Christians, Druses, or Jews, are the crux of the problem. But under the rule of the Turk, the minorities did not suffer, as is generally believed, from religious persecution. The Turk is tolerant by nature as by policy. But they did suffer from a religious idea translated into political supremacy; and so, in self-defense, they wrought political weapons of their respective creeds. Every sect rallied under the banner of its patron saint and placed itself under the protection of one of the European Powers. The Maronites looked to France; the Orthodox, to Russia; the Protestants and the Druses, to England; begging, crying at times aloud for deliverance, not from Mohammedan oppression, but from a Turkish administration that acquired its power and worked its will through a Mohammedan majority. Thus, while religious toleration was the rule and practice, religious sentiment and sectarianism, zealous and blind in the Christians and the Mohammedans alike, were at the bottom of every grievance, every political issue or combination, every concession or compromise. And the European Powers, although aware of these conditions, made no attempt to change them.

But there is a dominant national note to-day in most of the political parties and factions, no matter how colored they may be by religious sentiment or prejudice. For though the people are still divided on many questions of minor importance, they are, with one exception, all agreed upon four fundamental political principles: First, that Syria, Palestine, and Mt. Lebanon, included, shall remain one and undivided; secondly, that there should be but one central govern-

ment; thirdly, that Arabic shall remain the principal language of the land; and fourthly, that the Jews shall not be permitted to establish a Zionist state in Palestine. The exception referred to is Mt. Lebanon. But even the Maronites, who are the majority Christians of Mt. Lebanon, are divided into three parties, one desiring independence from the rest of Syria under French protection, another desiring absolute independence without any mandatory at all, the third favoring a union with the other Syrian principalities which stand for the four cardinal principles of the national programme. The American Commission will find this out in a single day and would find nothing else if it remained in Syria for a year.

Now, having determined upon these political principles as a foundation, the Syrians are entitled to the right—they ought to be given the opportunity—of choosing and establishing a government of their own. But for the peace of the world and their own future welfare, it should be a government free from the exclusive domination of any one people or creed—absolutely free, in other words, from any domination based upon a religious claim, a religious sentiment, or a religious concession. There is small doubt that such a government, if placed under the protection of one Power only, to be designated by the League of Nations, would gradually achieve self-dependence and strength, and would prove itself capable of administering justice and maintaining peace and security in the land. I said one Power only, because a trusteeship of nations or more than one mandatory in the country, would prove fatal to the four cardinal principles mentioned. Indeed, two or more mandatories in Syria would have a tendency to engender the international jealousies and rivalries of the old "sphere of influence" plan, and would hinder, even defeat the new movement of what may be called de-religionized nationalism.

The autonomous government of Mt. Lebanon, guaranteed and protected by six Powers before the war, is a case in point. Nominally, it had but one governor, a Christian; virtually, it had six. For the Consular representatives of these Powers, who were to act as advisors, often became dictators. And in their striving for political prestige and influence at the capital, they encouraged and supported local factions, political and religious, and thus perpetuated and accentuated the sectarian divisions that kept the people denationalized and retarded the country's progress. Egypt, under the protection of six Powers, would have been, in this sense, another Mt. Lebanon.

Lord Cromer, who is a competent judge in such matters, speaks of international control, or administrative internationalism, as tending "towards the creation of administrative impotence." In other words, it results in less control, more friction, and no protection at all. For if those who are to guide a nation coming into being disagree among themselves or side with this political faction or that religious sect, what chance is there for any real guidance and protection? During the elections in Mt. Lebanon the Consular representatives of the so-called protecting Powers were so many political bosses, each one supporting the candidate of his choice.

There is no doubt that the American Commission will dwell in its report on these matters, emphasizing the essential principles on which almost all the Syrians are agreed. And it is to be hoped that the Allies, true to the lofty principles of racial integrity and national freedom for which the war was fought and won, will consider the report of the Commission favorably and will not experiment again in Syria with any project based on the religious differences of the people in order to justify the designation of two or more mandatories in the land.

AMEEN RIHANI

# Correspondence

## Ireland—Expostulation and Reply

To the Editors of THE REVIEW:

It occurs to me that some of your readers who may be interested in the recent article of Professor Turner on the Irish question would like to have him explain two of his statements.

As I recall it he says that the Irish live under the same laws as the English. What does he mean by this? Does he mean the same thing as we do when we say that the Georgia negro lives under the same laws as the whites? Lord Morley tells us that his first experience in the Irish office was the examination of a case in which a priest was convicted of a crime and the jury that tried him was composed exclusively of Protestants although the country in which he was tried was 97 per cent. Catholic. In fact, every county in Ireland has almost exclusively a tory administration of justice, regardless of the population. Is this the kind of laws under which the English live? I have no library to which to refer and do not know whether I am correct in stating the above or not, but I do know that for the past fifty years every reform that has been granted to Ireland has followed a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and the arbitrary imprisonment of the leaders that advocated that very reform. Such has been the case in land reform, the attempts to enact Home Rule and other acts about which we hear so much when English rule is praised.

The other statement which I should like to have explained is the one that the act of Union was approved by the Irish and the present Government is of their own choosing. Who were permitted to vote at the election and how was the election carried on? Were Catholics allowed to vote? It seems to me that the great body of the Irish race was disqualified from voting. My earliest recollection of Irish affairs is a description of an Irish election held shortly after the act of Union in which Richard Lalor Shiels describes the voting. All voting was *viva voce* and the landlord stood beside the tenant and shook him until he voted as told. The hero of an election was the dare-devil who voted against the landlord and he was generally severely punished.

With the landlord desiring English protection for his rights and controlling all votes, and with the great bulk of the population disfranchised, it seems to me that the less said about that election the better.

Just one word in defense of the interest taken by the Americans of Irish descent in the Irish question. Ireland lost by starvation in two years five times as large a percentage of her inhabitants as England lost in the four years of the World War. She lost by emigration every year for the next 60 years after the famine two-thirds as large a percentage as England lost in the four years of war. This was all under the English rule. Generally speaking, the emigrant left on account of that rule. Do you expect him to forget everything and leave no tradition to his children? You urge friendliness for England on account of certain traditions and inheritances; we take no exception to this, but it seems to me that the Irish have a right to retain an interest in and a desire to better the land of their fathers. I might add that the United States to-day has a typical Ulsterman for President, with all his intolerance and bull-headedness; does the *Review* like it?

READER

*Kennewick, Washington, July* 12

To the Editors of THE REVIEW:

With respect to the first of the questions of your correspondent, I meant my assertion as I made it: "Irishmen have as members of the United Kingdom exactly the same political status as other citizens in the British Isles." That is to say, the laws of the United Kingdom are made by a parliament composed of representatives of the people of the United Kingdom, elected by the people; and in this parliament sit representatives of the Irish as well as representa-

tives of the other inhabitants. It may be added that the Irish now have twice as many representatives as their population warrants.

The statement contained in the second question is not one which I have made. Your correspondent will find on referring again to my paper the following: "the act which accomplished this [the Act of Union] in 1800 was unpopular and was brought to pass through bribery and intimidation." I did not in my brief statement add, what Lecky has explained so well, that no measure of reform or change could have been carried through the old unreformed Irish parliament without bribery and corruption, since, like the British parliament before 1832, it represented a small number of people and was unwilling to sanction any measure which might abridge its special privileges and vested interest.

It is not necessary for me to do more than note briefly that the negroes of the South are to a great extent debarred from taking part in the government of the communities where they live and are at the same time subject to numerous discriminations made by the white people, while Irishmen participate in the government and are not normally subject to any discriminations; that the numerous suspensions of *habeas corpus* in the past fifty years, regrettable as they are, have yet seemed necessary if the authorities were to cope with the violence and disorder used by Irishmen trying to effect changes which they wished—the disorder might seem to those who participated in it entirely justified, but it was at the same time proper from the point of view of the authorities that order should be maintained; that there was no election on the issue of the Union, and that Catholics were not allowed to vote in elections then—but no more were most of the people in England or the United States at that time; that in the early part of the nineteenth century voting was almost everywhere restricted to a few, and many of those who were allowed to vote were very largely controlled by landlords or employers; that the evils of earlier English administration which caused emigration, so far as they did cause it, have for some time been done away with; that it is most proper for Irishmen or their descendants in this country to wish well to Ireland and try "to better the land of their fathers," but that they will assist more successfully if they first obtain adequate information about present Irish conditions, and then act fairly and justly; that to call President Wilson "a typical Ulsterman" will seem to many people the highest possible compliment to northeast Ireland.

EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER

*Ann Arbor, Mich., July 22*

## Professor Corwin on the Covenant

To the Editors of THE REVIEW:

In the welter of declamation against the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is refreshing to encounter the restrained and dignified argument of Professor Corwin against it in the *Review* of June 7. No advocate of the Covenant can maintain that there are not substantial objections to it. Every advance, every adoption of a new policy or abandonment of the old, is a step into the unknown and must be taken with some risk and in the face of unanswered doubts. The conservative who puts the argument against a change clearly and strongly does a useful service, especially so if he avoids common exaggerations which awaken only intellectual contempt.

In any discussion of the Covenant, there are two general considerations which should be regarded as fundamental. In the first place some of the arguments advanced are not so much against the Covenant in particular as against any covenant which could be formed, if it created a league with really efficient powers. This fact is not an objection nor an answer to the arguments. To attack any league is a legitimate attack upon this one. But it is desirable for the defender of the Covenant to be able to say whether a point which troubles his mind is an objection to this Covenant merely, and therefore perhaps suggests a change which ought to be made or a misunderstanding which ought to be corrected, or is an objection to every workable covenant and therefore probably to be disregarded. Examples of such general attack are to be found in most of the objections which have been made to Article X.

In the second place a good deal of the argument proceeds on the supposition that the United States can and ought to have everything that it wants exactly as it wants it. The necessity of compromise in a complicated situation is ignored, and the present is a complicated situation full of conflicting interests which on both sides are valid interests. It is probable that Professor Corwin has taught his students the necessity of the compromises of the Constitution, but the present situation is closely parallel to that of 1788 and it is hard to see what compromise of the Covenant is likely to awaken after two generations such serious objections on moral or other grounds as did the slavery compromises of the Constitution. To deny the necessity of compromise, to insist that the United States should have its own way on every point, no matter what other nations may be forced to yield, is to render the formation of any covenant impossible.

A specific instance of this kind of argument is the assertion that the special promise to France by England and the United States to defend her frontiers against future German attack is evidence that the makers of the League distrust their own work and feel the need of adopting supplemental measures. As this point has been sometimes stated, it has been difficult not to believe that it was deliberate misrepresentation. This accusation can not be brought against the statement as made by Professor Corwin, but it seems clear that the inference to be drawn from the special agreement is quite the opposite from his. To refuse France's demand that the special protection she desired should be provided in the Covenant, where it would be distinctly out of place, and then to induce her to consent to its omission and to quiet her natural but unnecessary nervousness over her exposed eastern frontier by the supplementary agreement, is to show confidence in the League not distrust and is a legitimate compromise, made with special wisdom outside and not in the Covenant.

A more important impeachment of the Treaty, based on a demand for the ideal without regard to actual conditions, has reference to the Shantung agreement. I doubt if anyone in England or America would undertake to answer all the objections which can be made to that agreement. It is certainly not ideal. There is no doubt, however, that Great Britain and the United States stand somewhat in advance of the rest of the world in the demand that ideal justice and right be carried out in actual international arrangements. What are the statesmen of these two countries to do when the task is laid upon them of making a working partnership with other nations who will have as much to do in carrying on the business as their own two countries and without whom it can not be carried on at all? If the ideal is insisted upon in every particular, especially where the peculiar interests of other nations are urgently pressed, what will be the result? Under such conditions, if a league is to be made, only one outcome is possible—compromise, and the duty of the true statesman is not to demand inflexibly the ideal but to see to it that that compromise is made which is the best that can be had from the ideal point of view. Special antagonism to the Shantung agreement is excited by referring to it as an example of an alleged yielding to the discredited principle of the balance of power. This assertion is an inference merely, not supported directly by any facts which we know at present, and it need not be accepted by anyone who does not wish to do so, so long as an equally good inference as to the reason for the agreement is forthcoming. In the first place, if I were arguing with some of the Senators, I should say that it is logically indefensible to use a term

of technical significance out of its ordinary meaning in order to cast odium on an arrangement not approved. If it is necessary to maintain the possibility of a defensive union against an unrepentant Germany—the hard necessity, as Professor Corwin calls it—there is then no historical justification for applying to an agreement for that purpose the technical name of a peculiar international doctrine and practice invented by European diplomacy after the fifteenth century. If there is, then every defensive alliance since the days of the cave man is an application of the doctrine of balance of power. That an alliance endeavors to balance or to out-balance a prospective enemy does not make it an instance of the balance of power, historically so called, for historically the term has a quite other and special significance. In the second place it must be remembered in considering Shantung that France, Italy, and other nations have insisted on securing national interests and obtaining compensation in a somewhat similar way though with more historical justification. It would be very strange if Japan, which has shown no evidence of being even so far advanced as these peoples in regard for ideal considerations, did not in turn urge similar interests and the need of like compensation. If granted to others, it would be practically impossible to deny the claim of Japan. It would not be a Japanese alliance with Germany or Russia that would be otherwise to fear, but the tumbling of the whole structure of the peace treaty. But where outside of Shantung could a similar concession to Japan be found? The answer to this question is what the statesman must find, and the attempt to do it by a critic of the treaty would be an enlightening experiment. The arrangement demands nothing of China which she has not already granted, and the definite promise of restoration gives her a new advantage. This argument must not be understood to be a defense of the Shantung agreement on any ground but that of necessity, but it is an emphatic declaration that in judging of it the necessities of the situation must take precedence over ideal considerations.

In comment on Article X and on the Monroe Doctrine, Professor Corwin is much more discriminating than many critics of the Covenant. There appear, however, the same two sets of objections, one based on misunderstandings or exaggerations and the other revealing a fundamental difference of attitude and faith which must either prevail against the League or give way to it. The second can easily be disposed of. Professor Corwin says: "It is clear, I think, that this Article is quite out of place in the League Covenant." The answer to this is simple and draws the fundamental issue squarely. It is that the Article is indispensable to the Covenant, that it is its very backbone, and that without it no league can be formed of any value for the preservation of peace. If there were any hope of removing this fundamental contradiction of view, it would lie in doing away with the misapprehensions which have gathered about Article X. Plainly it protects the members of the League against one specific thing and one only, "external aggression." There is perhaps some carelessness of formulation here, but the words should be ambiguous only to a criticism which is determined to criticise and not to understand. The execution of a judicial mandate or a mandate of the Council is not aggression. Only the unwarranted attack of an outside power is included. The Article does not protect against internal revolution, nor against the separatist action of a part, nor against partition with the approval or by the influence of the League, or by purchase and sale or by any kind of negotiation. The relation of the Article to the Monroe Doctrine, though that has been generally overlooked by opponents, should help to make it clear. The United States is asked to assume by this Article no obligation which it has not already officially assumed towards the States of the American continents with reference to non-American Powers. It is now asked to extend that obligation, and no other, to all the members of the League and to join with them in carrying it out everywhere, an immense enlargement of the influence of the United States and, if we can trust the honesty of our own purpose, an immense moral advance for the world. It is quite evident from the character of much of the discussion regarding the effect of the League upon the Monroe Doctrine that the objectors have in mind popular extensions of that doctrine—a virtual dictatorship of the United States over all American states for one example—which have never been officially affirmed and which have never been, nor ever would be, accepted by any strong American state. Unless the United States proposes to do by excuse of that doctrine something which the moral opinion of the world will not approve, we should rejoice that the rest of the world has come to our position in regard to aggressive action by one state against another and is ready to join with us in forbidding it. To object is as absurd as would be the position of a man who, being asked to look after a neighbor's house during the absence of the family, should refuse the assistance of the police as an interference with his rights.

In conclusion there are several other points in Professor Corwin's argument which should be briefly considered. That Article XXIII calls upon the United States to transfer to the League powers of government which can only be transferred by the Constitution making sovereign is an important suggestion and should be carefully considered, but it depends manifestly upon an interpretation of the Article in question which involves several nice distinctions which can not be here discussed, even if one accepted in the case the necessity of an amendment to the Constitution. That the League exists "primarily to safeguard the interests of the Powers controlling it," that it has "for its primary purpose the maintenance of a solidarity of interests among its principal members" seems to me an assumption without justification. It is based upon a belief which is surely mistaken, that the League represents no moral advance in international relations over the period of the balance of power. The apparent excuse for it is the preponderance of power in the Council given to the Big Five, but would it be possible to work a League as a going concern in any other way? And Professor Corwin has just before noticed in relation to the establishment of "an international tribunal comparable to the Supreme Court of the United States," which he desires, that "the thing which more than anything else has stood in the way of its establishment has been the insistence of small states upon equal representation in its membership." Is it true to say that "the authors of the League have confused two very different problems . . . that of furnishing the peace settlement . . . and secondly the problem of providing a permanent procedure for the peaceable settlement of international controversies." That the Conference has attempted to settle these two problems together and in the same document is no doubt true, but that is an entirely proper thing to do and does not involve confusion, and the effort to show that confusion has followed is not successful. The Council of the League is not "a continuation under a new name of the Peace Conference." Its powers are quite different and much more independent. It is rather a continuation under a new name of the War Council of the Allies, and one of the surest foundations of hope for the future success of the League is the great simplicity of the machinery which the Covenant establishes for its management against all sorts of temptations to complication. Conciliar management of an alliance of nations has abundantly proved its success, and the omission of elaborate legislative, judicial, and executive regulations is clear evidence of careful reflection. "Regional understanding" was not a fortunate designation of the Monroe Doctrine since it may undoubtedly mean an understanding between two parties, but it may also without question mean a one-sided understanding which prevails throughout a region, like the understanding about negro suffrage which prevails

in the South and like, I imagine, the understanding concerning the enforcement of prohibition which will prevail in many regions, some of them not large, when that law comes into force.

"Despite some appearances to the contrary, the Senate to-day occupies a position of great stategic advantage." May the party of moral ideas which controls the Senate see the moral issues which are involved in the present decision!

GEORGE BURTON ADAMS

*New Haven, Conn., June* 28

## Article XII; Not Article X or Article XXI

To the Editors of THE REVIEW:

A treaty thus unequal in its conditions, thus derogatory to our national rights, thus insidious in some of its objects, and thus alarming in its operation to the dearest interests of the United States in their commerce and navigation, is in its present form unworthy the voluntary acceptance of an independent people, and is not dictated to them by the circumstances in which providence has kindly placed them. It is sincerely believed, that such a treaty would not have been listened to at any former period, when Great Britain was most at her ease, and the United States without the respectability they now enjoy. To pretend that however injurious the treaty may be it ought to be submitted to in order to avoid the hostile resentment of Great Britain which would evidently be as impolitic as it would be unjust on her part, is an artifice too contemptible to answer its purpose. It will not easily be supposed, that a refusal to part with our rights without an equivalent will be made the pretext of a war on us; much less that such a pretext will be founded on our refusal to mingle a sacrifice of our commerce and navigation with an adjustment of political differences. Nor is any evidence to be found, either in history or human nature, that nations are to be bribed out of a spirit of encroachment and aggression by humiliations which nourish their pride, or by concessions which extend their resources and power.

To do justice to all nations; to seek it from them by peaceable means in preference to war; and to confide in this policy for avoiding that extremity; or securing the blessing of Heaven, when forced upon us, is the only course of which the United States can never have reason to repent.

No, this is not a present-day discussion of Article XXI, or Article X, or the Shantung cession, or any other of the contents of the Versailles Treaty of 1919; it is an excerpt from a letter written by James Madison ("The Writings of James Madison," edited by Gaillard Hunt, Vol. vi, pages 256-257), written August 23, 1795, in reference of the Jay Treaty of 1794. One part of that treaty, Article XII, encountered so much hostility in the United States Senate that, when the treaty was finally ratified by that body on June 24, 1795, an amendment provided that Article XII should be suspended.

E. F. HUMPHREY

*Princeton, N. J., July* 25

# Book Reviews

## Economics and British Common Sense

NEW FALLACIES OF MIDAS. A Survey of Industrial and Economic Problems. By Cyril E. Robinson, with an introduction by Sir George Paish. New York: Robert M. McBride & Company.

THE writing of a book on political economy which is comprehensive without being exhaustive, scientific yet not academic, interesting but not trivial, is a real achievement; especially in these days when intelligent laymen, lacking the courage to wrestle with one of the standard text-books, are eager for more knowledge of economic questions than they can get from newspapers and magazines. The text-books are good, of course, and necessary to a thorough knowledge of the subject, but for a book like this, which contains so much seasoned thought in so small a compass, the busy layman should be truly thankful.

The first part of the book is a sort of primer of political economy, a preliminary exposition of certain fundamental concepts—work, value, capital, monopoly, rent, expenditure and the like—leading up to an examination and criticism of industrial society from the points of view of socialism, syndicalism, and individualism. None of these ideals, the author finds, can be realized in human society, for all have their fatal defects; but they have also their strong points, which, if taken over by capitalism, would make that system almost ideal and well nigh invulnerable. This is sheer eclecticism, no doubt, but Mr. Robinson calls it compromise, and roundly asserts that by means of it the English have created political democracy, and will sooner or later achieve industrial democracy as well. Certainly, the conservatives of England have shown extraordinary capacity for absorbing the best ideas of their opponents, even as the aristocracy has maintained its vitality by the influx of new blood from the middle class.

However that may be, Mr. Robinson points out, as many others have done, that socialism, notwithstanding its ideals, is theoretically unsound, and that, if fully realized, it would involve a servitude more irksome than the "wage slavery" of the present day. Besides, there is no assurance that state socialism would give the wage earners any permanent benefit; on the contrary, it might cause a serious falling off in production, in which case there would be universal poverty and no diminution of social discontent. Unless we could be content, like the ancient Greeks, to be civilized without being comfortable, socialism would be a failure; and, emancipated but disappointed, we should be longing for the flesh pots of Egypt. And yet, socialism has contributed something to politico-economic theory by showing what the state can do, and any plan for improving industrial society must take this into account.

While socialism has lost its hold on British labor, and the socialist members at Westminster are but a "handful of discredited cranks," syndicalism, less political but more revolutionary, has occupied the vacancy; and now the cry is for decentralization, direct action and unions of productive labor. Let the miners own the mines, the railway servants the railways, the agricultural laborers the farms, and let the state be little more than a statistical bureau, determining needs and adjusting values. Obviously, private property becomes group property under this system, and there is danger of exploitation as before, necessitating interference by the state, thus bringing centralization in by the backdoor. For all that, syndicalism has made an important contribution to political thought by showing what *esprit de corps* can be aroused in a productive group, and what notable results might be achieved if this enthusiasm could be utilized for increased production.

Similarly, individualism, notwithstanding its glorification of the strong and its cynical neglect of the weak, has its own offering to make for the general good. Liberty is the most precious possession known to man, more highly valued by the freeborn than life itself. From the economic side two phases of liberty are essential to happiness and progress—the right to choose or bargain, and the right to save, both involving, as prerequisites, the right to personal freedom and the ownership of property. The future industrial society, if it is to be truly successful, must provide for these.

Gathering up the threads of his argument, Mr. Robinson gives in rough outline his conception of the future industrial society. Capitalism will hold the field against all comers because no other system can give proper scope to the bargaining and saving instincts of man. This, however, by no means involves the concentration of property in the hands of a few; on the contrary, the ownership of capital can be and must be widely diffused, so that the workers may have a two-fold income and thus a double interest in the success and permanence of the capitalistic system.

The capitalism of the future will include what is of permanent value in socialism, for the state will carry on all those activities which can be done better by collective than by individual effort, although the limits to state activity can not yet be clearly defined. Similarly, capitalism will take what is best in syndicalism by giving more responsibility to groups of workers, allowing them,

where possible, a voice in the management, and encouraging them to acquire a financial interest in the business in which they are employed. Although profit-sharing has not yet been very successful, other plans for labor co-partnership are more promising. The time may even come when capital will no longer hire labor, but labor, whether of hand or brain, will hire capital. Then there will be no question of expropriating capital, but of encouraging its accumulation in order that it may be furnished to labor at the lowest rates.

Perhaps Mr. Robinson is a little too optimistic in his forecast because of his faith in the innate reasonableness of the English people. They grumble; they threaten; they rebel; but when confronted with an emergency they see where their true interest lies; they compromise their differences and unite with their former enemies until the trouble is overcome and the field is clear for other issues and new battles. State socialism is an importation from Germany, which the British have never taken seriously. They have played with French syndicalism in the same way and it is not likely that they will allow it to ruin the country. Fabianism is more to their mind, but the possibilities of improvement along that line are quite limited. Co-operation has been a great help to the laborers as consumers, but has not solved the problem of production. There is left the possibility of an alliance between labor and capital, and, as Mr. Robinson intimates, this is the only hope of industrial reconstruction in Great Britain.

Mr. Robinson's optimism seems to lead him astray in at least two directions. In the first place, he has no fear of the coming depletion of Britain's coal deposits, for long before coal is gone, we may be certain that some substitute for coal will be discovered. Engineers and other scientific authorities are not so confident as to that. Again, Mr. Robinson lightly dismisses Malthusianism as mere moonshine, and argues that the world is not within a thousand years of being overcrowded, because Russia has a population of only 23 persons to a square mile while Belgium formerly had 625. Such loose thinking in these respects does not, perhaps, invalidate Mr. Robinson's general argument; neither does it alter the fact that the United Kingdom has 45,000,000 people to support and can not maintain these in comfort unless she can hold and increase her trade with the less populous regions of the earth.

As to Midas, the author presents him at the beginning of the book and again at the end to point the moral, telling what a great mistake he made in wishing that everything he touched might turn to gold and in thinking that a miracle could make him a happy man. Now, as in the day of Midas, wealth is not the same as welfare, and material things alone can not satisfy the soul. The life is more than meat and the body than raiment. If capital and labor both realize this, and if teachers plan their systems of education with the highest ends in view, a brilliant future lies before the British people.

## National Readjustments

PROBLEMS OF PEACE. By Guglielmo Ferrero. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.

THE GREAT PEACE. By H. H. Powers. New York: The Macmillan Company.

PROFESSOR FERRERO, in a brilliantly written little volume, has sketched interestingly and accurately the main outlines of European history from the downfall of Napoleon I to the conclusion of the Great War. He does more than this. With his breadth of historic vision, his insight, and his power of coördination, he points out the failures of statesmen in the past and the way of wisdom for the future. His main conclusion, on the last page, in favor of the League of Nations deserves to be quoted, both because it is the mature opinion of Italy's foremost historian and because it differs from so much of the imperialistic and anti-American talk which has been finding expression in Italian newspapers: "The Americans, who have already saved Europe from German domination by intervening when Russia abandoned the common cause, can do much to help Europe to save itself from the dangers which await it by using all the authority America so justly enjoys to encourage and impel the old continent to follow this path resolutely. They will by so doing render a great service to Europe, and to America as well. Western civilization is a grandiose Gothic vault, soaring sublime toward the sky. One of its arches is Europe, the other is America. If either arch is broken, the other will be endangered."

There is in Ferrero's volume relatively little special pleading for Italy. Italy, he thinks, however, was originally compelled to become an ally of Germany and Austria in 1882 in order to defend herself, not against France which had seized Tunis, but against Austria which was dangerous because Austria and Prussia had put an end to their long antagonism to each other. Italy really got nothing but the assurance that Austria would not harm her, while Italy on her side had to repress "irredentism." The Triple Alliance of 1882 was, therefore, for Italy nothing but an empty shell. But when the alliance was renewed in 1887 Count Robilant obtained real advantages from the pact with the Germanic Powers by two additional clauses; by one Germany undertook to give armed aid to Italy if France, in Africa or elsewhere, attempted to alter the balance of power in the Mediterranean to Italy's disadvantage; by the other clause Austria pledged herself to respect the status quo in the Balkans as far as possible, and, in the event of being compelled to occupy more Turkish territory, to consult and compensate Italy adequately. Italy's motives in entering and carrying on the Great War may not have been quite what the author would have us believe, but there is truth in his contention (p. 252) that "though the effects of Italian intervention were at first not much felt by the Allies it may be said that the forces of Italy were the salvation of the world at the most terrible crisis of the war, between the collapse of the Russian front and the arrival of American reinforcements in sufficient numbers." For Italy's reward he personally makes only the modest and wholly justifiable claim to the Trentino, Trieste, and Istria. "Part of the nation would like to add Dalmatia and its islands and a protectorate over Albania . . . and her share of Asia Minor. But the Italian people are not in agreement about these claims, because influential groups maintain that the national, historical, and strategical reasons which justify the former demands do not cover Dalmatia, and they are very reluctant to involve Italy too deeply in Eastern affairs" (p. 242).

Professor Ferrero does not discuss in detail any of the complex problems which President Wilson had to face at Versailles, but only sets forth a few guiding principles which a century of history has made manifest, especially the importance of the recognition of the principles of Liberalism and Nationalism. By all lovers of Italy his volume will be welcomed as a little missionary which aims to retain for Italy the high regard of the American people.

Mr. Powers begins where Ferrero leaves off. Writing last autumn when victory was in sight and a peace conference imminent, he attempts to indicate the details of a just and lasting peace. After an elaboration of general principles he considers in turn the various regions of the earth where nationalities wish to be recognized, boundaries drawn, and wrongs set right. Many of the questions which were of supreme interest when the author wrote last October have now been settled (for the time being, at any rate) by the treaty which Germany has ratified. Most of them have been settled in a more radical, thorough-going, and anti-German way than he advocated or anticipated. Mr. Powers easily knocked to pieces the simple, off-hand solutions which were so freely offered early in the war by well-meaning persons who knew little of the complexity of European

problems. For he has traveled much in Europe and is able from personal knowledge to set forth warningly and impressively the difficulties and complications of rival claims. But he has failed to catch the enthusiasm and optimism of the newly-liberated nationalities; he often remains without a satisfactory solution of his own, or is pessimistic as to the suggestions of others. Austria-Hungary, he thinks, ought to be kept together, with the possible exception of the Czecho-Slovaks, but even for these "the prospect is not bright." "Polish history offers an inadequate basis for faith in a Polish future," the German menace of economic domination is dangerous, and hence he favors for Poland autonomy and federation with Russia rather than a nominal and unreal independence. To none of the other border peoples of the former Russian Empire would he accord any recognition, except perhaps the Finns. In the liberated parts of Western Asia and Africa he would probably favor the mandatory system, if that had been invented when he wrote. Time only can show whether his more conservative way of handling the problems of nationality would have been the wiser course.

## A Novelists' Novelist and His Clients

The Works of Leonard Merrick: Limited Edition.

CYNTHIA. With an Introduction by Maurice Hewlett. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

THE ACTOR-MANAGER. With an Introduction by William Dean Howells. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

CONRAD IN QUEST OF HIS YOUTH. With an Introduction by Sir James M. Barrie. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

WHILE PARIS LAUGHED: Being Pranks and Passions of the Poet Tricotrin. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

"THERE have been many author's editions," says Barrie in his preface to "Conrad in Quest of His Youth," "but never, so far as I know, one quite like this, in which the 'author' is not the writer himself but his contemporaries, who have entirely 'engineered' the edition themselves and have fallen over each other, so to speak, in this desire to join in the honor of writing the prefaces. Such is the unique esteem in which Mr. Merrick is held by his fellow-workers. For long he has been the novelists' novelist."

A title glorious enough but not free from negative implication. We may fancy Leonard Merrick accepting it with smile responsive but slightly rueful, since to be the tidbit of the elect is to be caviare to the general. This joint tribute of his fellow-craftsmen is a sort of amende. "Why, then," says Mr. Howells, after giving his testimony, "is not this masterly novelist a master universally recognized and accepted? That is something I have asked myself more than once, especially in reading the criticisms of his several books, not one of which has lacked the praise of some critic qualified to carry conviction of its merit." Perhaps, he answers tentatively, because these books do not deal with titled persons and a great world; or because, however individual poverty and misery may be conquered in the given story, there remains a sense of the poverty that still remains in the world; or —and here we abandon geniality for criticism—because "the stories are almost always unhappy, very unhappy. There is no consolation in their tragedy; they do not even 'raise a noble terror' such as was once the supposed business of tragedy. Upon the whole, they leave you feeling mean, feeling retroactively capable of the shabby things which have been done in them."

This is a grave indictment, too grave, one must think, to be urged against the spirit of genial irony which rules Mr. Merrick's work as a whole. The novel for which Mr. Howells here in a way stands sponsor is "The Actor-Manager," which he thinks "in every way the best of Mr. Merrick's stories." He adds, it is true, "so far as I know them;" but this qualification does not change the fact that the book for him sums up satisfactorily enough the merits and defects of his author. But what of the other three stories on our list? From them, surely, we turn without any such sense of dingy complicity as Mr. Howells fairly connects with that rather dispiriting study of the theatrical world, "The Actor-Manager." Mr. Howells finds hearty praise, and rightly, for the rare excellence of Merrick's "form." The appraiser says he can not explain what he means by form, but mentions this practitioner's easy concealment of mechanism, and has in mind also, one supposes, that instinctive economy of means and that firm flow of narrative which are so much more commonly mastered to eastward than to westward of the Strait of Dover. There are John Galsworthy with his perfect handling of the major episode, Frank Swinnerton (in "Nocturne," at least), Sherwood Anderson but now in the tense restraint of his "Winesburg, Ohio" sketches. But Mr. Leonard Merrick is more easily and lightly a master of form than any of these. It is inherent in his action, keeps us continuously and expectantly in motion, with never a pause or a hiatus. "There is no one with a greater art of telling a story," says Barrie, accordingly, "if that art consists in making us forever wonder what we are to find on the next page."

But the one thing we may be sure of (and this may be what has prevented Merrick's "universal acceptance") is that we shall find at the end no pat and comfortable solution of what may be called the running problem of the action. The story will have been told, but we ourselves left, as it were, with one foot in the air. Mr. Hewlett nearly puts his finger on the point when he speaks of Merrick's "underlying, deeply-funded sympathy with real things and fine things, and the seriousness of aim which, tantalizingly, stops short just where you want it to go on, and provokes the reader to get every book of Mr. Merrick's as it appears, just to see him let himself go—which he never does. He is one of the most discreet dissectors of the human heart we have." To dissect the human heart is bad enough (says the universal acceptor); to be discreet about it is hardly tolerable.

Meanwhile it is interesting to see how each of this man's fellow-workmen finds what he wants in him, and distrusts the rest. How natural that Barrie should exult in "Conrad in Quest of His Youth," and should express a good-humored envy of a performance which is, indeed, a good deal in his own line. How natural that Mr. Howells should be atracted to the careful, if not highly enlivening realism of "The Actor-Manager," and should trace an analogy to his favorite Russians. And as for Mr. Hewlett, what more in character than his deprecation of the main theme of *his* chosen tale, and his exaltation of the romantic character of Cynthia. Apart from their "form," their excellence of structure, these books have in common a mood of unimbittered disillusion. "Cynthia" and "The Actor-Manager" express the almost foredoomed struggle of the honest but not inspired artist between his conscience and a livelihood. "Conrad in Quest of His Youth" expresses the hopelessness of middle age's yearning for past days and their irrecoverable zest. Strange how envious and apologetic the early forties are in the presence of the early twenties—as if the lesser age were the real possessor of the earth, and the greater a mere lingering encumbrance! "While Paris Laughed" gives utterance to the mellower remembrance, indulgent without envy, of maturity for youth and its follies and ecstasies. The poet Tricotrin is very ridiculous: who would not have been in his shoes, at that age? Mr. Merrick has accomplished no more surprising feat than the sublimation, in this book, of those very materials which have been so tediously pawed over and refurbished by commercial chroniclers of the pseudo-Bohemian life.

This limited edition, newly set with the author's final corrections, is notable for its modest excellence of format and its very reasonable price.

H. W. BOYNTON

# Three Books About Poetry

A New Study of English Poetry. By Henry Newbolt. New York: E. P. Dutton and Company.

Convention and Revolt in Poetry. By John Livingston Lowes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.

The New Era in American Poetry. By Louis Untermeyer. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

MR. HENRY NEWBOLT'S twelve lectures on English poetry constitute an informal "Poetics" for our time. Mr. Newbolt is a liberal with reservations. We doubt if he has melted down his plate; perhaps he has merely sent it to the new firm of silversmiths, Messrs. Bergson and Croce, for reëngraving. He restates the old poetical faith in terms conformable to the new philosophy, as fifty years ago theologians were recasting the Pentateuch in forms considerate of Darwin and Spencer. Mr. Newbolt is finally, we suspect, a sacristan in the great Catholic and Apostolic Church of English poetry, but a sacristan proud of the new memorial windows to Bridges, Yeats, and Binyon, and willing to place an altar candle at least for Mr. T. Sturge Moore. He has a quick and various delight in poetry; his attitude toward it is almost chivalrous; his faith brightens his polemic, like a glove worn upon a helm. He is, in short, a mixture of analyst and rhapsodist, a very good analyst sometimes, a very good rhapsodist sometimes, but not free from the liabilities or disabilities implicit in the combination. It is natural enough that his analysis should be happiest in negation. His disapproval of anything modern is the weightier for being cautious and polite; in an excellent lecture he disposes of the futuristic plea of Signor Marinetti with a suave thoroughness in which the thoroughness is braced by the suavity.

Mr. Newbolt defines poetry as "the act of expressing an intuition in words" (page 8), and an intuition is apparently little more than a sensation or impression realized as ours. This identifies poetry with an elementary psychic act, and in its vast comprehensiveness the old notion of rarity and specialty in poetry is lost like a chapel in an amphitheatre. Mr. Newbolt, however, is a worshiper, if man ever was, and he proceeds to restore the rarity and specialty by a definition of *great* poetry on lines quite remote from the definition of poetry itself. Great poetry is that which "touches the universal longing for a perfect world" (page 17). This definition seems not so much erroneous—as supine. The analyst is reposing; for the moment Mr. Newbolt is not so much rationalizing poetry as poeticizing logic.

Mr. Newbolt is much stronger in his contention that forms must vary and renew themselves, since form is merely the embodiment of spirit, and the sign of the authenticity of spirit is difference or variation. This removes the dykes, but Mr. Newbolt, never so radical as his advertisements, restores the greater part of them by a very sensible remark to the effect that a "form, a metre, a stanza, may be used a hundred times by a hundred writers, and each time with originality" (page 305). In other words, the multiplex in metre is not the *condition* of multiple effects. For Mr. Newbolt personal expression is supreme. He does not quite class epics and dramas with lyrics, but he seems to regret that he can not nerve himself for the plunge. Of course he is right in the ultimate sense that poetry inheres finally in the man. We can not lock Shakespeare out of "Hamlet"; Shakespeare could not lock himself out. But Mr. Newbolt seems to us ill-advised in slurring the evident and important distinction between what moves us directly through its influence on ourselves and what moves us indirectly through our sympathy with its effect on others.

Mr. Newbolt seems at times on the point of acquiescence in Croce's doctrine that the test of artistic merit is the agreement of the artist's work with the artist's intention. But Mr. Newbolt is not an Englishman for nothing; from that verge he recoils, asking with quite irrefutable force: "A work of art may be a perfect expression of the maker's feeling, but what if that feeling be a cruel, a cynical, a frivolous, or an insane feeling?" (page 353). To which nothing need be added. The exorcism of that spectre is complete.

In the first chapter of Mr. Lowes's notable book, "Convention and Revolt in Poetry," the author is troubled by the fact that in poetry the means of communication is words, and that words, unlike the things they stand for, have neither form, color, warmth, taste, nor smell (page 7). How can this be? Mr. Lowes's distress grows out of his failure to perceive that words do not give objects directly, but give *meanings* which *do* give objects, and that, while the relation of word to meaning is that of a check to its umbrella, the relation of meaning to object is that of a shadow to its substance or an echo to its sound. Now checks—with patience—will fetch umbrellas, and shadows are images of things; and those two obvious but overwhelming little facts are the quietus to all Mr. Lowes's perturbations on the subject of the arbitrariness of words. Mr. Lowes, having decided that words can not express things, decides that they express nothing but relations, and by relations he means the likenesses of which simile and metaphor are the conduits (pages 8-14). Language can not give an eye or a star, but may express their similarity; as if the relation between an unimagined eye and an unimagined star could be conveyed in any form that would have value for an art whose basis is the imagination.

After this first misadventure comes a bright and deft, but not supremely important, chapter on the "Ways of Convention," and then the *book*—the real book, the great book, begins. It is difficult to be patient with Mr. John Livingston Lowes. What is to be said of the sheer rapacity of a man who adds wisdom to scholarship and modernity to wisdom and equipoise to modernity and brilliancy to equipoise and geniality to brilliancy? What is to be said of the moral obliquity of a writer who robs his readers of the legitimate consolation of finding his defects in some particulars commensurate with his preëminence in others? What lastly, is to be said of a man who has packed into one book all the good things that the reviewer expected to say about poetry in the next ten years, and has rifled his existence of its meaning? It is doubtful if another American could bring an equal knowledge of the past to the assistance and support of an equal knowledge of the present. He is perhaps the single critic among us whose attitude toward innovators is wholly admirable, an attitude by which their friends and their adversaries might equally profit, and he has a smile as tolerant as Chaucer's for the queer grotesques who add themselves daily to the varicolored and noisy pilgrimage to our poetical Canterbury in this April of uncertain winds.

Mr. Lowes's cogency is great. He forces even the born quarreler, the man who peaks and pines in the lassitude of assent, to a continuity of agreement by which he is at once astonished and provoked. One half wishes, however, that he would omit those Meredithian parallels to free verse on pages 277-279 which plague one with a flitting doubt as to his possession of the soothsaying ear. Surely that doubt is calumnious; without that gift how shall we explain that store of perfect phrase from the masters with which his memory is gemmed? We may add, much in his own vein, that the profusion of this pearl and gold in a judicial treatise strikes us as a little barbaric; a court of justice is not a cave of Aladdin.

A reader fresh from the catholicity of Mr. Lowes finds it difficult to keep step with Mr. Louis Untermeyer in the depreciation of the New England poets which occupies the foreground of his introduction. They lack "keen and racy originality," the quality that makes "the art of all great writers a human and enduring thing" (page 5). This detraction, even if successful, would be useless. On the current theory, which is undoubtedly Mr. Untermeyer's, that the fitness of literatures to peoples is a *relative* and a *changing* fitness, the sound-

ness of yesterday is no threat to the validity of to-day. The June number of a magazine need not defend itself against the competition of the May number by assertions that the May number was vapid or droning; it has a much surer defense in the far less debatable affirmation that May is May and June is June. In any large view the generations stand or fall together; futile ancestors will have baffled descendants. God, or Nature, or Destiny, or what you will, has not begun to love this waspish little world since 1850. Not even the birth of Carl Sandburg and Edgar Lee Masters has sweetened the temper of the universe. Does not Mr. Untermeyer see that if Emerson and Lowell and Whittier, in their day and in their way, really lived, the chances of a real life for Mr. Sandburg and Mr. Masters and Mr. Untermeyer, in their differing day and way, are indefinitely heightened?

We deprecate Mr. Untermeyer's causticities because it seems to us that he belies his own disposition in their utterance. In him these prickles are cutaneous; they have no roots in the large geniality of his temper. Again, one notes with interest that the same sin has different gravities in different persons. It is very wrong to enforce morals in poetry if you can offer no better excuse for this impertinence than the fact that you are Emerson or Lowell. But if you are Mr. James Oppenheim, the case is altogether different. It is regrettable that the privilege of being Mr. James Oppenheim is so unequally distributed in the United States of America.

Mr. Untermeyer's specialty is hardly thought; least of all is it analysis. Scholarship is a wrap for the aged and infirm with which his redbloodedness can cheerfully dispense. His clash with tradition now and then penetrates even to his grammar, and a profuse, hearty, jovial English does duty for style. On the other hand, his acquaintance with present-day verse is wide enough to shame other critics into a recognition of their own shortcomings. His sensibilities, naturally keen, if not subtle, have been quickened by the exercise of a poetical gift which, if somewhat overworked and undertrained, is nevertheless a true gift, revealing a frank and joyous commerce with the world as its distinctive property. This leads us to the pith of his criticism. Mr. Untermeyer is an appraiser of vitality. In the old days it was assumed that living people were alive as a matter of course, and literature undertook, not to bestow that life, but to give it shape and direction. Nowadays we have discovered that the world which physicians and biologists innocently presume to be alive is really in a state of semi-swoon or stupor, and the first object of literature is not to guide it or fashion it, but to bring it to. If your patient has fainted, the cordial is more timely than the food; above all things you must cut his stays. The matter is burlesqued a little in the above phrases, but the burlesque covers a real, if qualified, sympathy with Mr. Untermeyer's attitude in this point. The characteristic vice of æsthetic impressions—of impressions of beauty—is tenuity; the desideratum in such feelings is often, not fineness or nicety, but energy. Mr. Untermeyer tests the new poetry for life, and that touchstone, even within the confines of the newer verse, is fruitful in discriminations. Toward H. D. and the Imagists he is cool; even the homage to Miss Lowell, though ample and unhesitating, is official in tone; it reminds one of a military salute. It may be thought that Mr. Untermeyer's criteria of life and death are rough-and-ready. In some persons he mistakes the convulsive for the animated; there are other persons whom he buries alive. The writer of this article can find a good deal of vitality in his graveyard, possibly because he is an inmate of the place. After all deductions, however, our critic has done a thing that it was well to do and that only a radical could have done for radicals. For that service let our thanks be ample.

# The Run of the Shelves

ERNEST DOWSON is not a wholly admirable figure. If he had added rather more than he did to the world's store of beauty, it would, of course, not have found itself particularly troubled by the helpless dissoluteness, the utter lack of purpose and of self-control that marked the thirty-three years of his life. As it is, it will not be disposed to judge him too harshly, it may well, indeed, extend its pity and a measure of gratitude; for there are plenty of "drunk and disorderlies" who contribute nothing in exchange for the nuisance they make of themselves. Dowson, at least, did something. But it is one thing to be Poe, and it is another thing to try admiringly to behave like him—and worse; it is one thing to be Keats, and quite another to be, as Arthur Symons describes Dowson, in a little volume of his "Poems and Prose" (The Modern Library: Boni and Liveright), a "demoralized Keats."

Equally not at home in England and in France, he plumbed the depths of decadence and literally ended with the century. Incapable of giving body to the vague dream of beauty that haunted him, he sought a petulant and thwarted revenge by immersing himself in the sordid. French literary *cénacle* and cabmen's shelter in London were alike to him, since all were nothing. "Cynara" is the poem most generally remembered, "certainly one of the greatest lyrical poems of our time . . . an intoxicating and perhaps immortal music," says Mr. Symons. But a very tawdry poem, for all that. The little "Requiem" for Neobule comes nearer, in our opinion, to an adequate expression to his very pretty and generally frustrated gift.

In his "Women Novelists" (Charles Scribner's Sons) Mr. R. Brimley Johnson undertakes the not unprofitable task of presenting the file of English women novelists from 1778 to 1876 in that solidarity always produced in women by the withdrawal of the interfering male. As critic Mr. Johnson is not authoritative; indeed his criticism, of which the due supply is punctiliously forthcoming, is mere inspectorship in which gauging and measuring take the place of sensibility. It is hard to believe that he has even applied his mind to some of his own judgments. Speaking of Miss Austen's comic figures, he says: "We laugh *with* the eccentricities, not *at* them" (page 242). Now the difficulty of laughing with Mr. Collins or Lady Catherine de Bourgh, for example, though a very simple one, is quite insuperable: Mr. Collins and Lady Catherine do not laugh. If Mr. Johnson means that we identify ourselves with these persons, he exaggerates our humility; it is as difficult to feel with Mr. Collins as to think with Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Johnson has a "Great Four," comprising Miss Burney, Miss Austen, Miss Brontë, and George Eliot. He is friendly to Miss Burney, zealous for Miss Austen, circumspect with Miss Brontë, and apprehensive of George Eliot. George Eliot's faculty, her varied executive force, is almost harassing to Mr. Johnson; he seems to view it as an incumbrance to George Eliot herself. (The luggage of women is always a distress to their male companions.) She had not so great a genius as Jane Austen or Charlotte Brontë; of that Mr. Johnson is certain (pages 208-9). She was "once acclaimed very humorous" (page 242)—*sic transit gloria mundi.* Mr. Johnson is more happily employed in the recall to momentary prominence of gifted writers, like Mrs. Craik, Mrs. Oliphant, and especially Miss Charlotte M. Yonge, whose fall from popularity to neglect was effected with merciless celerity. He has a good eye for critical documents; in fact he might have compiled an interesting chronicle of the rise and fall, or the flux and reflux, of these writers in critical and popular esteem. His true office in relation to these ladies is that of escort.

The grouping of these novelists calls attention to an unusual trait or contrast of traits which many of the leaders illustrate. Revolt and check-strong revolt

kept in hand by stronger authority—is almost the peculiarity of the clan. Even in Maria Edgeworth and Jane Austen the potential rebellion is discernible. Both wrote decorous—ultra-decorous—novels, yet both showed a vigor of satiric impulse which, in another time, another race, or another sex, might have overturned decorums. Mrs. Shelley, who defied society in her elopement with a married man, lived to write the romance of "Frankenstein," which upheld, to quote her own words, "the excellence of universal virtue." The Brontë sisters, Charlotte and Emily, wrote novels equally remarkable for daring and the arrest of daring, novels in which a passionate originality bows finally to the restraints of a Yorkshire parsonage. George Eliot's case, probably the most signal of its kind in history, hardly calls for discussion. Never did emancipation go so far only to find itself halted and turned back by refusals peremptory enough for a Scotch Calvinist or a Massachusetts Puritan. Even Mrs. Ward, whom Mr. Johnson does not touch, exhibits traces of the same anomaly. Her fame began with a novel whose radicalism extorted a polite rebuke from the leader of political liberals, Mr. Gladstone; at the present date the securities, including perhaps the sobrieties and gentilities, would claim her as a valuable ally. The examples seem too numerous to be accidental. View these women novelists as disciples and subjects, and you are struck by their independence; view them as rebels and protestants, and you marvel at their conformity. The double temper is possibly explicable by the sex; perhaps it relates itself to the life of an island people, a people to whom the call of the sea is excelled or equaled by only one other force—the call of the port.

"A Treasury of War Poetry" (Houghton Mifflin) appears in Second Series, under the editorship of Prof. George Herbert Clarke. It *is* a treasury, filled with banners, various and splendid, and if a little faded by the passage of only a few months, still capable of stirring and summoning. It would be rash to say that there is a single great poem in the collection, but with such a record the future will never be forced to wonder what it felt like to live the war. As to what it was fought for, the poets are a good deal clearer than the politicians.

The reflux of British interest and sympathy into ante-bellum channels may be mildly presaged in the publication of the "Life and Letters of William Thomson, Archbishop of York" (John Lane Company), prepared with taste and affection by Ethel H. Thomson, his daughter-in-law. The appeal of such a book will be mostly to the fellow-citizens and fellow-believers of the kind Archbishop who was successful for twenty-eight zealous years in reconciling manliness with a cassock and modesty with a throne. An American will linger a little over the signature, "W. Ebor," in which the shortened form of the Latin rendering of York (Eboracum) hides the homespun name of Thomson in the amplitude of its spreading train of historical associations. Ritualism is a conspicuous topic in the book, and, from the standing-ground of 1919, one looks back with a mixture of envy, pity, and astonishment at the seeming beatitude of a time and class which resorted to points of vesture and gesture to supply its demand for conflict and excitement. One is reminded of the early prosperous days of the Vicar of Wakefield in which the migration from the blue bed to the brown assumed the magnitude of an event. The Vicar's family, like England in our time, had its terrible awakening. Will the new time be restorative of the old values? One would be glad to know if the Primroses, in their old age, amid the fading memories of the anguish which had convulsed the family life, ever reinstated in its old significance the annual transition from the blue bed to the brown.

In the latest text-book on American history, published in the year 1918, is a paragraph on "The Meaning of Land Ownership," in which the authors tell us that "the peasants of Europe were also engaged in tilling the soil [though] very few of them owned outright the fields they tilled. It was otherwise in the colonies." Later, in a section on "Land Ownership and Liberty," they say further that "the embattled farmers" were "free landowning citizens" who "paid tribute to no barons of the soil." In general they leave the impression upon the mind of the reader, in most cases a young pupil attaining his first knowledge of American history, that in colonial America every man owned the land he tilled in full and absolute title and was the greater lover of liberty because of that fact. While the connection between landowning and liberty, as these authors state it, is somewhat problematical in view of the known conservatism of the landowning classes, and while it is idle to quarrel with those who would dignify every revolutionary radical and agitator as a lover of liberty, we do take exception to their statement that every American colonist was the owner of the lands he occupied and cultivated.

The authors of this text-book, and others of like minds, will do well to study carefully a work that has just been issued by the Yale Press, entitled "The Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies," by Professor Beverley W. Bond, Jr., there to discover that outside of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island, not a colonist legally owned an acre of the land he held, and that thousands of them, either willingly or unwillingly, paid "tribute" in the form of a quit-rent to "barons of the soil." Whether this payment to the king in the royal colonies or to proprietors elsewhere played any very vital part in checking or increasing the spirit of independence or is deserving of any great amount of consideration at the hands of the historian is not the question. The point is that such a quit-rent existed and was paid by thousands of the "embattled farmers." It is high time that the writers of our text-books and others with more ambitious literary pretensions familiarized themselves with the facts regarding our colonial land-system, if they intend to write about it, and to all such we recommend Professor Bond's book as an admirable source of information.

Among the books of Henry Holt and Company's Autumn list are "Colas Breugnon," Romain Rolland's first novel since "Jean-Christophe," DeMorgan's "Old Madhouse" and Inez Haynes Irwin's "The Happy Years," a new Phoebe and Ernest book.

# It All Depends

Both in this country and in Canada the volume of outcries against what is termed the suppression of radical publications has been increasing among those who are pleased to call themselves revolutionaries. During the war the Governments of both countries in general and their post office departments in particular were the targets of bitter denunciation for their refusal to allow certain publications the use of the mails; among them Socialist periodicals that were believed to have given proof of opposing enlistment and obstructing the pushing of the war against Germany.

The seizing of power by the Bolsheviki has called forth legislation aimed to prevent the introduction of Bolshevism here. Although their control of Russia itself is anything but secure, the Bolsheviki have been boasting that they would make it hot for other countries, and there is not lacking proof that they have been sending funds to America and Canada to produce similar revolutionary movements. The sudden springing into existence here of Bolshevik periodicals evidences a campaign of agitation.

These periodicals, as well as certain native weeklies, have been declaiming against the Government for what they call its tyranny in adopting laws directed against freedom of the press and freedom of speech. In this cry the Socialists

have vehemently joined—widely split as they now are into Right and Left wings. At the same time they are doing or trying to do more in the way of censorship than the Government ever ventured to do. Before the split, the press of the pro-Bolshevist wing was full of charges that the regular Socialist newspapers refused to publish notices of its meetings and proceedings, and such charges were not unfounded. The regular Socialists now retort that if the Lefts ever obtained majority power or rule by force they would ruthlessly suppress all moderate Socialist publications, as they have done in Russia. But whatever the two factions may do and say among themselves, both assume the rôle, before the great outside public, of being valiant defenders of the complete freedom of the press against what they denounce as reactionary forces.

Such professed solicitude for both the abstract and the practical rights of freedom has a most touching quality, and easily imposes upon the unsophisticated. No agency, in point of fact, has been as rigorous and arrogant a suppressor of a free press as this self-same Socialist party. Before the war, it was vigorously suppressing; and the precedents it then instituted still remain as precedents to be similarly exercised whenever its leaders think it expedient. The case of the *New Review* is an exemplification of this policy.

The *New Review* was an independent Socialist periodical founded in New York City in 1912 by Herman Simpson, William English Walling, Alexander H. Fraser, Bertha W. Howe, and others, all of whom were then members of the party in good standing. In its issue of August, 1913, the *New Review* published an article entitled "Danger Ahead," which showed that the membership of the party was declining at an alarming rate, that in a single year 50,000 dues-paying members, or about two-fifths of the entire enrollment had deserted. The figures were in fact taken from the *Party Builder*, the official organ of the party's National Executive Committee. But as published in that journal, their significance, owing to the obscure way in which the matter was put, was not easily visible, even to party members. Moreover, it was supposed that few outside the Socialist party ever read these dry, formal statements. But the article in the *New Review* was full, explicit, and conspicuously featured. It pointed out that this great defection was in large measure due to a constitutional clause forced through the Indianapolis Socialist National Convention in 1912 by Mr. Hillquit, Mr. Berger, and other leaders which provided for the expulsion of any member advocating sabotage. While the editors of the *New Review* likewise opposed the use of sabotage, they believed that the passage of the constitutional clause was unwarranted and unnecessary. The bureaucrats, naturally, could not deny the accuracy of the facts which the *New Review* had published. What enraged them was the "exposure" and the extent of public attention which it attracted. But in addition they had long resented independence of spirit within the party, and they now determined, by stifling the *New Review*, to discourage the starting of any similar periodicals.

The Central Committee of Local New York thereupon passed a formal resolution boycotting and blacklisting the *New Review*. This proscriptive order barred not merely the issue containing the article to which objection was raised. It prohibited the sale and circulation at Socialist party meetings of all future issues, notwithstanding the contributors of the *New Review* were leading Socialists in many countries. What the order signified was the assumption of a hierarchy to dictate to members and prospective members what they should and should not read. Yet the claim could not be substantiated that the sole object was to circulate exclusively Socialist matter. At one juncture, when it suited the designs of certain of the leaders, the entire national machinery of the party was used to boost the circulation and sale of the *Metropolitan Magazine*, a non-Socialist publication. The mailing lists of the party were placed at the disposal of the business office of that magazine, and members were employed as canvassers to drum up subscriptions within the party ranks. The nominal justification for this promotion was that the magazine contained a series of articles by Mr. Hillquit. But the subscriptions solicited were not for these few issues, but for six months or an entire year.

Just what the order against the *New Review* did may best be gathered from extracts of a written protest sent, on September 24, 1913, by the New Review Publishing Association:

> To the Central Committee of Local New York, N. Y. City. Comrades: Through the Socialist press and otherwise it has come to the notice of the Board of Directors of the New Review Publishing Association that the Central Committee of Local New York (Manhattan) has promulgated an order forbidding the Branches of the Local from selling or distributing *The New Review* at public or propaganda meetings.
>
> While comprehending perfectly the motives underlying this order, the Board of Directors of The New Review Publishing Association desires to protest vigorously against it. The members of the Board, who are also members of the Socialist Party, deny the right of any authority in the party, even the highest, to dictate to the smallest subdivision of the party what kind of Socialist literature it may or may not use in the propaganda of Socialism. This Board regards the action of the Central Committee as a usurpation of authority, which, if permitted to stand, threatens to destroy within the party all freedom of speech or press and to suppress all honest and free discussion.
>
> Free speech and free press are the most fundamental of all democratic rights, antedating the birth of the Socialist movement, and no progressive movement, least of all the labor movement or the Socialist Party, can thrive without the freest discussion of principles, policies, tactics and methods of procedure.
>
> It has been asserted that this act of the Central Committee is not a violation of free press because it relates only to public meetings. The members of this Board deny that any valid distinction can be drawn between propaganda and other meetings. In the first place, the sale and distribution of literature takes place almost exclusively at propaganda meetings; hence to prohibit the sale of *The New Review* or any other publication at such propaganda meetings is equivalent to prohibiting its sale at practically all meetings. Secondly, to prohibit a minority from disseminating its views among those not yet members of the party is practically to prohibit that minority from propagating the ideas of Socialism in accordance with its own lights.

The protest concluded by demanding that "the high-handed and usurpatory order in question be reconsidered and rescinded." It was complacently ignored, not only by the body to which it was addressed, but by the whole Socialist party and its regular press. The very Socialist newspapers and periodicals which later, during the war, shrieked about governmental "violation of freedom of the press," had not a single word of condemnation to say on this occasion. To them the expurgation of the *New Review* was a perfectly proper and necessary demonstration of Socialist party discipline, and they stoutly defended it as such. But the main justification given was that the *New Review* was tacitly siding with the believers in sabotage. This was a pretext, as events proved. Less than four years later, when German agents were instigating the sabotaging of industrial plants here, a resolution was passed, in a formal national committee meeting, revising its attitude on sabotage.

Proscriptive tactics of this nature have been carried further by Lenin and Trotsky. Having the power to decree anything they please, they have suppressed, not merely bourgeois and moderate Socialist publications, but also trade-union magazines. One instance of many is the following decree published in the Bolshevik organ, *Bednota*, September 17, 1918:

> Suppression of the newspapers.—The Department of the press decides definitely to suppress the following magazines, which stirred up agitation and made appeals to the upsetting of the power of the Soviets. They are: *The Professional Union*, *The Typographer*, and the newspaper, *The Free Voice of Labor*.

The list of publications suppressed by the Bolsheviki is a long one. No printed matter of any kind disapproved by the Bolshevik rulers, whether newspapers,

(*Continued on page* 264)

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(*Continued from page* 262)
magazines, books, or pamphlets, is allowed. The suppression is not merely temporary, it represents a permanent and implacable policy, attended by summary shootings. It has been hailed with delight by the Left wing of the Socialist party in the United States, which declares it "a necessity of class warfare." The Right wing, although disapproving of the suppression of moderate Socialist newspapers, strongly relishes the suppression of all "bourgeois" publications.

Yet facts such as these make no impressions upon the gullibles who, taken in by a flow of professions, rush forward to represent the radical press here as victims of a grinding governmental oppression.

GUSTAVUS MYERS

## Books Received

### FICTION

Aikman, Henry G. The Groper. Boni and Liveright. $1.60.

Emerson, Willis George. The Man Who Discovered Himself. Forbes & Co. $1.50.

Goodman, Daniel Carson. The Taker. Boni and Liveright. $1.75.

Locke, W. J. Far-Away Stories. John Lane. $1.50 net.

Off Duty. Compiled by Wilhelmina Harper. Century. $1.50.

Tarkington, Booth. Ramsay Milholland. Doubleday-Page. $1.50 net.

Weyl, Maurice. The Choice. Mitchell Kennerley. $1.50.

### GOVERNMENT AND ECONOMICS

Fitzpatrick, Edward A. Budget Making in a Democracy. Macmillan. $1.50.

Kalau, Maximo M. Self-Government in the Philippines. Century. $1.50.

Purinton, Edward Earle. Personal Efficiency in Business. McBride. $1.60 net.

### TRAVEL AND DESCRIPTION

Edwards, William J. Twenty-five Years in the Black Belt. Cornhill Co. $1.25.

Hershey, Amos S., and Susanne W. Modern Japan. Bobbs-Merrill. $1.50 net.

Power, Rhoda. Under the Bolshevik Reign of Terror. McBride. $2.00 net.

### POETRY AND DRAMA

A Treasury of War Poetry. Second Series. Houghton Mifflin. $1.50.

Dowson, Ernest., Poems and Prose of. The Modern Library. Boni and Liveright. 70 cents net.

Drinkwater, John. Abraham Lincoln, a Play. Houghton Mifflin. $1.25.

Hagboldt, Peter. The Test. Cornhill Co. $1.25.

### RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY

Hyslop, James H. Contact With the Other World. Century. $5.00.

Kelman, Rev. Dr. John. The War and Preaching. Yale University Press. $1.25.

### MISCELLANEOUS

Gillian, Strickland. A Sample Case of Humor. Forbes & Co. $1.25.

Husband, Joseph. A Year in the Navy. Houghton Mifflin. $1.35.

Symons, Arthur. Studies in the Elizabethan Drama. Dutton. $3.50 net.

Tompkins, Raymond S. The Story of the Rainbow Division. Boni and Liveright. $1.60.

Trevelyan, G. M. Scenes from Italy's War. Houghton Mifflin. $3.50.

## The London Spectator Welcomes The Review

"The *Review* . . . is destined, we are sure, by its sanity and its wit to a long and prosperous career. It has been a cause of keen regret to many English readers that the once famous New York *Nation*, which used to reflect the spirit of New England, has become openly pro-German, pro-Bolshevik, and anti-English, while the *New Republic*, which was started some years ago to compete with the *Nation*, has also displayed a curious partiality for the Germans and Bolsheviks, though it is less hostile to this country. We are pleased to find the genuine American note sounded in the *Review*, as it is in the *Bellman* of Minneapolis, the *Villager*, and, of course, in the popular illustrated weeklies. It is highly important in these days that the educated public here should study the development of American opinion, and the *Review* will, we believe, represent the real America and not the wealthy little cliques which are more at home in Berlin or Moscow than in New York or Boston or Washington.—*From the (London) Spectator, June* 14, 1919.


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